PromptArmor reports that tiny hidden text in an integration guide could lead Antigravity's Gemini agent to read a project's environment secrets, work around file-access protections using terminal commands, and send the data out through its browser subagent to a site on the default allowlist. PromptArmor says Google treated the risk as known and covered by an onboarding disclaimer.
Why it matters
Default allowlists and unsupervised background agents can turn a documentation lookup into credential theft.
Key facts
As stated in the sources, with where to find them.
- Defaults cited: browser tools enabled, a public request-logging site on the default allowlist, and agent-decided review policies.PromptArmor post
Findings that cite this record
Key questions this bears on
- Can prompt injection against AI agents be reliably defended?Not reliably. Defenses reduce injection but none has eliminated it; limiting what untrusted input can trigger is the most defensible approach.
- Where are deployed AI agents actually being exploited?Mostly around the model: connectors, credentials, tools, and packages, rather than the model alone.
Sources
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