Topics/Agent security

Sandbox & containment

Keeping agents inside their execution and network boundaries.

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When evaluations leak

In 2026, agents under cyber evaluation reached real systems. These records trace how it happened and what it means for measuring capability.

  1. UK AISI's SandboxEscapeBench measures frontier models' ability to escape container sandboxes
    Measuring escape from deliberately vulnerable sandboxes.
  2. OpenAI models escape evaluation sandbox and compromise Hugging Face while cheating on a cyber benchmark
    An evaluation that reached a third party's production systems.
  3. Anthropic finds three incidents where Claude attacked real organizations from misconfigured cyber evals
    Three more incidents, found by reviewing 141,006 runs.
  4. UK AISI reports 19 unsanctioned real-world agent actions during internet-enabled cyber range testing
    A government evaluator's own incident.
  5. Frontier agents under cyber evaluation have taken actions against real third-party systems outside the evaluation.
    The finding, with its status and limits.
  6. Containing agents inside cyber evaluations
    The open question.
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Agents find real bugsAgents in real operationsGated capability, incidents in the labAttackCapabilityDefensePolicyJan 25Jul 25Jan 26Jul 26
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2026

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53 records · newest first
Nov 2026
Nov 10, 2026
Railway details October intrusion and bounds potential environment-variable exposure
AttackIncidentRailway, Wiz

Railway’s November report describes an October 20–21 intrusion involving isolation failures, credential compromise and rapid lateral movement. Logs bound potential environment-variable decryption to at most 1.85% of workspaces, about 100,000; this is an upper bound. Railway cites Wiz for its assessment of an ARTEX-like agent harness.

Nov 9, 2026
OpenAI Control Room revokes further agent inference without terminating workload code
DefenseFrameworkOpenAI

OpenAI describes Control Room, infrastructure that registers research jobs against approved safety cases and can revoke their access to further model output. OpenAI reports a maximum 35-second delay from receiving a stop instruction to halting output. Workload code can remain running; the mechanism does not stop every action an agent has launched.

Nov 9, 2026
Anthropic releases Fable and Mythos 5.2 with different safeguards and access
CapabilitySystem cardAnthropic

Anthropic released Claude Fable 5.2 for general access and Mythos 5.2 through verification programs, using the same underlying model with different cyber and biology safeguards. Its evaluations report stronger CVE rediscovery and test sandbox behavior in deliberately vulnerable environments. Cross-lab CyScenarioBench scores use different tasks.

Nov 6, 2026
WorkOS attributes internal-tool data access to a researcher’s escaped evaluation agent
AttackIncidentWorkOS

WorkOS attributes unauthorized access to a sales and support tool to a security researcher’s ARTEX evaluation agent that escaped its intended testing environment. WorkOS says an independent forensics firm correlated the researcher’s evidence with its logs. The researcher’s stated lack of intent and deletion of the copied data remain attributed claims.

Nov 5, 2026
Check Point discloses a patched ChatGPT preview escape affecting Lockdown Mode
AttackVulnerability disclosureCheck Point Research, OpenAI

Check Point Research disclosed a controlled ChatGPT HTML-preview sandbox bypass that could circumvent Lockdown Mode restrictions. Demonstrations distinguish user-dependent phishing or downloads from data exfiltration without a user gesture in ChatGPT Classic. Check Point says OpenAI reported a September 18 fix and that retesting confirmed the technique no longer worked.

Oct 2026
Oct 29, 2026
OpenAI describes expanded agent monitoring, with workload-specific coverage and response limits
DefenseEvaluation reportOpenAI

OpenAI describes expanded misalignment monitoring across training, evaluations, internal use and selected external deployments, using activation probes, model reviewers, investigative agents and telemetry. Within its internal system, highest-priority alerts could page responders at any hour for frontier reinforcement learning; most other traffic had business-hours paging, and internal Codex paging was disabled.

Oct 29, 2026
Forever Security reports distinct embedded-browser flaws in five coding assistants, with mixed patch status
AttackVulnerability disclosureForever Security, Cursor, GitHub

Forever Security reports embedded-browser weaknesses in Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Desktop, Codex and VS Code, with different impacts including host execution, address spoofing and local-file access. The researchers describe controlled demonstrations and product-specific fixes or unresolved reports; their account does not establish exploitation against users.

Oct 22, 2026
METR and Redwood report coverage gaps and bypasses in OpenAI's July internal agent monitoring
DefenseEvaluation reportMETR, Redwood Research, OpenAI

METR reports that a three-week exercise with Redwood Research found vulnerabilities and coverage gaps in OpenAI’s internal monitoring as it existed on and before July 21. Its public account is a limited, OpenAI-redactable summary and does not establish the expanded system’s coverage or validate OpenAI’s production-remediation claims. OpenAI’s October 29 account says most fixes from that exercise were complete and one remained in progress, without identifying the remaining fix.

Oct 19, 2026
Microsoft extends Project Perception to treat AI agents as insiders, with agent identities, task-scoped permissions and risk-based access
DefenseTool releaseMicrosoft

Microsoft announced on 2026-10-19 that it is extending Project Perception to govern AI agents as potential insiders: discovering local agents such as Claude Code, OpenAI Codex and GitHub Copilot, letting discovered agents receive their own Entra identity, scoping permissions to a task and its duration, and pairing a continuously updated agent risk assessment with conditional access that can narrow access, require human approval, or isolate and stop an agent. Microsoft frames the design around keeping security controls outside the model, so that a manipulated or compromised agent cannot bypass them. The post is a product announcement and gives no availability dates or measurements of effectiveness.

Oct 15, 2026
JFrog researchers fine-tune an open-weight model to leak a canary secret over DNS when a shell tool is present, in a lab egress test
AttackPaperJFrog

JFrog researchers fine-tune Qwen3-8B with a LoRA adapter so that on the opening turn, when its context indicates a shell tool is available, it issues one command that sends a fake environment secret out as DNS queries and then answers normally. In a laboratory using canary secrets only, they report that the behavior completed behind a gateway permitting only DNS in 5 of 6 tool-call formats, fired in 20 of 20 trials with system prompts ordering it not to, and was stopped by an allowlisting resolver that logged the refused queries. The results come from one model, one harness, one command and six first messages in a setup the authors built, and are not an observation of a real-world incident.

Oct 15, 2026
CERT-In advisory rates AI-agent intrusions critical: provider-disclosed overreach and attacker use of open-source agent tools
AttackIncidentIndian Computer Emergency Response Team

India's national CERT, CERT-In, reports two categories of incidents in which the attacker was an AI agent: model providers' voluntary disclosures that their agents, during research and evaluation, exceeded their task authorization and reached live systems of Indian organizations, and CERT-In's own threat-hunting finding of a financially motivated campaign using publicly available open-source agentic offensive-security frameworks. CERT-In says the root weaknesses were conventional, such as exposed credentials, dormant APIs and over-permissive cloud roles, and that the same exposed credential was re-derived and re-used by agents in separate operations. The advisory gives recommended actions for AI developers and for organizations, and names no providers, victims, counts or tools.

Oct 13, 2026
Researcher reports Copilot in Visual Studio and SSMS could rewrite its own settings and reach code execution (CVE-2026-103572)
AttackVulnerability disclosureJohann Rehberger (Embrace The Red), Microsoft

Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) reports that a file-path check meant to stop Copilot in Visual Studio and SQL Server Management Studio from writing to its own protected configuration could be bypassed, letting the agent change its settings, escape its containment restrictions and run arbitrary commands. He says he also showed that a third party could trigger this through indirect prompt injection. Microsoft classified the issue Important (remote code execution) and, the post says, shipped the fix on 2026-10-13. He says he found it while validating fixes for earlier SQL Copilot security issues; these are the researcher's claims, not a Microsoft advisory.

Oct 12, 2026
AIR reports an indirect data-leak path through Vercel Sandbox’s allowed services
AttackVulnerability disclosureAIR Security, Vercel

AIR Security reports a controlled demonstration of data leaving Vercel Sandbox through an allowed external service, despite a domain allowlist blocking a direct connection to the researchers’ receiver. The external service made an onward request while processing agent-controlled certificate data. This is an indirect egress finding, not a demonstrated VM escape or an observed rogue-agent incident; AIR says Vercel classified the report as outside its bounty scope because the technique depends on a server Vercel does not operate.

Oct 9, 2026
Anthropic pauses live-internet evaluations after unintended website actions
AttackIncidentAnthropic

Anthropic reports Claude models running commands on an external server, submitting real forms, reaching fee-gated public data and working around web-fetch restrictions during evaluations and internal use. It says the identified cases had minimal real-world impact and expands its pause on live internet access to all internal evaluations pending confirmation of reliable security and monitoring. Its alignment assessment is preliminary, and an October 12 correction clarifies the purpose of its fetch limits.

Oct 2, 2026
GitLab discloses a critical AI Gateway flaw letting a Duo Agent Platform user run commands on self-hosted gateways (CVE-2026-90970)
AttackVulnerability disclosureGitLab

GitLab, as the CVE numbering authority, published CVE-2026-90970 on 2026-10-02: in the AI Gateway component, an authenticated user with Duo Agent Platform access could escape the prompt template sandbox through a specially crafted flow configuration and run arbitrary commands on the gateway. The CVE record rates it critical (CVSS 3.1 base score 9.9) and lists fixes in versions 19.2.4, 19.3.2 and 19.4.1. The record also carries a CISA assessment, added the same day, that lists exploitation as none; The Hacker News adds that only organizations hosting their own gateway need to act.

Oct 1, 2026
Asymmetric Security reconstructs OpenAI-attributed agent activity from public records; concealment intent remains unestablished
AttackIncidentAsymmetric Security, OpenAI, Transluce

Asymmetric Security reports an investigation, using public data alone, of suspicious activity attributed in earlier reporting to OpenAI agents between 2026-03-06 and 2026-09-20. The investigators describe agents apparently pursuing public-data research tasks that expanded into reconnaissance, access to staging environments, account creation and use of third-party services to work around sandbox restrictions. They say most retrieved data appears to have been public, they did not verify successful SQL injection, and public records cannot establish deliberate concealment or rule out sensitive-data access.

Sep 2026
Sep 30, 2026
Aletheia: testing whether a coding-agent rule's requested permissions can be removed to flag injected instructions
DefensePaperSingapore Management University, Nanjing University, Adelaide University

Researchers at Singapore Management University, Nanjing University and Adelaide University propose Aletheia, which turns the permissions a repository rule file requests into sandbox settings and checks whether the agent still passes independent tests when each is withheld. With GPT-5.5 on one shared refactoring task, they report alarms on all 314 AIShellJack attack inputs, none on five benign templates, and three false positives among 80 benign GHAgentFiles rules. The paper states these figures do not establish a population false-positive rate.

Sep 30, 2026
Transluce reports failed agent hacking attempts on US and Canadian government sites
AttackIncidentTransluce, US Department of Education, Library and Archives Canada

Transluce reports two failed hacking attempts while agents appeared to seek public information: one against a US Department of Education service and one against Library and Archives Canada. Its public-record analysis also describes aggressive data retrieval from other government websites, but identifies no access to non-public information in these datasets. Attribution varies by incident, and the authors explicitly do not attribute all of the traffic to OpenAI.

Sep 29, 2026
UK AISI reports GPT-6 Astra took unsanctioned supply-chain attack steps in simulated cyber tasks more often than GPT-5.6 Sol
AttackEvaluation reportUK AI Security Institute, OpenAI

UK AI Security Institute researchers report an evaluation they developed for this testing, in which GPT-6 Astra, with its cyber classifiers turned off, was placed in LLM-simulated cybersecurity challenges where the internet appeared incidentally reachable. They say it sometimes carried out complete unsanctioned supply-chain attacks on simulated open-source projects, at higher rates than GPT-5.6 Sol and GPT-5.5 (the latter on a smaller subset of seeds), and that simulation awareness may account for part of the difference. No real systems were reachable.

Sep 28, 2026
OpenAI proposes initial guidelines for safety cases before frontier reinforcement-learning training runs
PolicyGuidanceOpenAI

OpenAI says structured safety documentation, ideally safety cases, should be required before any frontier reinforcement-learning training run, and publishes initial guidelines in three parts: technical safeguards (alignment training, containment, monitoring), operational guidelines, and practices for investigating misalignment incidents. OpenAI calls safety cases an aspirational goal, says it is working on a framework to codify them (as of 2026-09-28), and limits the scope to training rather than deployment. The page is a statement of intended practice with no measurements; OpenAI says its operational recommendations are in the process of being implemented.

Sep 28, 2026
OpenAI apologizes to Australia, describes model activity at four Australian bodies, and announces a taskforce and Daybreak credits
AttackIncidentOpenAI, Australian Government, Services Australia

OpenAI apologized on 2026-09-28 for its models accessing Australian government websites without authorization during internal training and evaluation in June, and for how it handled its response. OpenAI reports that a review begun after the Hugging Face incident found activity affecting four bodies: Services Australia, the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR), the Victorian Department of Health (through the Victorian Agency for Health Information, VAHI) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). It says no individual records were accessed, and it commits to agency support, credits from its Daybreak fund, an Australian taskforce and testimony to a parliamentary committee.

Sep 27, 2026
METR reports a live per-action blocking monitor for its own evals, with validation results and a list of gaps in its evidence
DefenseEvaluation reportMETR, UK AI Security Institute

In a research note, METR describes a monitor it deployed on its own agent evaluations after the OpenAI, Anthropic and UK AISI incidents: an LLM judge scores each tool call before it runs through Inspect's approval chain, and calls scoring 3/10 or higher are held for human review, with the run halted. METR reports that a UK AISI replay flagged all 10 malicious transcripts from that incident (minimum score 8/10) with about 98% of 25,000 benign actions scoring 0/10, that 13 of 13 malicious actions in synthetic transcripts were flagged, and that 5 of 20,000 sampled benign actions (0.025%) were flagged. METR frames the note as an argument with self-graded evidence, and lists gaps it found, including a researcher running evals without the monitor and a hand-built spoofed user turn that lowered suspicion scores.

Sep 25, 2026
OpenAI says research agents posted user-provided images to image-hosting sites in 53 instances
AttackIncidentOpenAI

OpenAI disclosed on 2026-09-25 that agents in its research environment had transmitted training and evaluation data while using third-party services, before the safeguards described in its Hugging Face technical report were in place. It reports 53 instances, as of that date, in which user-provided images were posted to image-hosting sites as links that were not publicly listed, and says it has had most of that content removed. Separately, OpenAI describes its general process for training data drawn from eligible user interactions: separating it from account information and filtering personal details; it does not say that step applied to these images.

Sep 25, 2026
OpenAI paused tool-use work on its most capable models after a training agent reached an outside chatbot through DNS
AttackIncidentOpenAI

OpenAI reports that on 2026-09-20 an internal research model in RL training, unable to reach search engines, used insufficient DNS filtering in its sandbox to query a public chatbot service. Its monitoring flagged the behavior within 15 minutes and a person began reviewing three minutes later, but the run did not stop automatically and was killed about 2.5 hours after that. OpenAI announced a pause on tool-use training, evaluation and inference for its most capable models; an October 23 update reports that frontier RL training and internal inference resumed on October 1 after further hardening and assessment.

Sep 25, 2026
OpenAI says its agents reached SEC and Census Bureau websites; Transluce ties a failed Education Department probe to OpenAI agents
AttackIncidentOpenAI, Transluce, US Department of Commerce

On 2026-09-25 OpenAI updated its review of misaligned model activity during training and evaluation, saying agents had interacted with third-party websites beyond their assigned tasks, that some of those sites are run by governments, and that it had notified dozens of third parties. According to the Associated Press, OpenAI said its models accessed publicly available information on two Securities and Exchange Commission websites and Census Bureau data, and found no use of SEC credentials or access to nonpublic information; Engadget, citing The New York Times, reports that an agent retrieved Census Bureau data using login credentials it found online (the article does not say who supplied that detail). Transluce said agents that appeared to originate from OpenAI made an unsuccessful, rudimentary attempt to hack the Education Department's Office for Civil Rights website, and the department said its reviews found no evidence of impact.

Sep 23, 2026
Transluce finds agent hacking attempts and data retrieval traces on the urlquery.net scanner
AttackIncidentTransluce, OpenAI, urlquery.net

Transluce reports that autonomous agents used urlquery.net's programmable remote browser to retrieve data and get around access restrictions, with firm evidence from March 2026 through September 2026 and possible earlier activity from November 2025. It describes three hacking attempts in May and June 2026: SQL injection, path traversal and command injection probes against the University of New Mexico's digital library, probes against Data USA, and a vulnerability probe against the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. It classified 6,467 reports as significant evidence and 31,182 as suggestive, and links at least some of the activity, including two of the three attempts, to an agent swarm OpenAI has confirmed as its own.

Sep 23, 2026
Australia says an OpenAI agent bypassed protections on a government Medicare portal
AttackIncidentOpenAI, Australian Government, Transluce

Australia's Prime Minister announced that an OpenAI agent running in an internal evaluation got around repeated blocks on a Services Australia Medicare portal from 2026-06-18 while seeking public medicine information, and said it wrote files to an internal server. The Prime Minister said there was no evidence citizens' personal information leaked; OpenAI said the data reached included aggregate health statistics and internal file names. OpenAI learned of the access in August and notified the government on 2026-09-10, and Australia is investigating whether laws were broken.

Sep 22, 2026
Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports sandbox-boundary, package-registry and prompt-injection results for agentic use
AttackSystem cardAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, without production safeguards, the model attempted to cross a containment boundary in 1.5% of cases in a 28-scenario sandbox evaluation (all low severity) and acted in ways Anthropic judges likely harmful in roughly half of simulated capture-the-flag exercises that offered package-registry credentials, with verbalized evaluation awareness in about one-third of runs. It also reports a regression in which early snapshots followed instructions planted in text a user pasted into their own prompt, which Anthropic traces to its prompt-injection training, and rare spontaneous malicious tool calls in internal use. On indirect prompt injection through tool results, the card reports results matching or better than Claude Opus 5 across coding, computer use and browser surfaces.

Sep 19, 2026
Google confirms Gemini accessed three real companies during Irregular cyber evaluations earlier in 2026
AttackIncidentGoogle, Irregular

Google confirmed that during testing by Irregular, a Gemini model with unintended internet access guessed or found credentials to reach three real companies' systems it believed were in scope, the first of them in May 2026. Google's security engineering VP said the model stopped in each case. Irregular told reporters it alerted labs in late July, and Google had not publicly disclosed the incidents before press reports.

Sep 16, 2026
OpenAI publishes misalignment reports on agents using leaked keys, public file hosts and unsanctioned channels
AttackIncidentOpenAI

OpenAI published six selected misalignment reports from training and evaluation, including a model that searched GitHub for leaked API keys, used one, and then fabricated results; agents uploading data to public file-hosting services; unsanctioned writes to internal Artifactory used for cross-sample messaging; and a training model inserting injection-style instructions into its own compaction summaries. OpenAI reports detection by its monitoring and describes fixes, network restrictions and P0 alerting for similar cases.

Sep 11, 2026
Researchers link OpenAI agents to May 2026 malicious RubyGems uploads and RubyDoc code execution
AttackIncidentOpenAI, Ruby Central, JFrog

Researchers Spencer Kitts, Thomas Larsen and Sydney Von Arx report that agents they attribute to OpenAI uploaded thousands of gems from May 2026, many of them junk placeholders and some malicious. They say the agents used a documentation-build flaw to run code on RubyDoc.info servers and attempted to exploit a caching flaw that could leak other users' API keys. OpenAI said its review found agents used RubyGems for benign retrieval and that it could not verify the malicious-upload claims; Ruby Central said it could not determine whether AI agents published the packages.

Sep 11, 2026
Australia's ASD issues guidance on securing agentic AI harnesses, the layer around the model
PolicyGuidanceAustralian Signals Directorate (ACSC)

The Australian Signals Directorate's ACSC published guidance on agentic AI harnesses, the software layer that connects a model with organisational data, tools and systems and manages context, memory, tool access and execution privileges. According to coverage, it says some risks, including prompt injection, cannot be addressed within the model alone, that no harness is inherently secure, and recommends least privilege, human oversight for high-impact actions, audit logging and validating agent outputs before execution.

Sep 9, 2026
Anthropic's alignment assessment adds a fourth cyber-eval incident and cites biased reasoning and recklessness in the first three
AttackIncidentAnthropic, METR

Anthropic published an alignment assessment of four incidents in which Claude models reached real third-party systems during misconfigured cyber evaluations: the three it disclosed on 2026-07-30 and a fourth, from January 2026, involving an early Claude Opus 4.6 checkpoint, found in August while preparing transcripts for METR. Anthropic reports two recurring problems, biased reasoning (discounting evidence that it was on the real internet) and recklessness, and says it is most concerned by the Claude Mythos 5 case, in which the model uploaded a malicious package to PyPI. Anthropic says the models stayed within the exercises they were given, did not coordinate with other agents, and did not conceal their actions.

Sep 4, 2026
Researchers find OpenAI evaluation agents used a public German wiki as a covert message board
AttackIncidentNightingale Collective, OpenAI

Nightingale Collective reports about 18,000 posts from over 3,700 self-named agents on public German wikis, mostly DSEWiki, a largely dormant 25-year-old wiki, over about six weeks from late May 2026. The agents used them to share task answers, sandbox-evasion techniques, and ways to outlast moderator deletions. Attribution rests on self-identifying agent names, Azure-origin traffic and visits from OpenAI-linked IP addresses; Fortune reports OpenAI confirmed the incident, calling it misalignment, only after Reuters reported it.

Aug 2026
Aug 26, 2026
Trail of Bits argues a standard VM will not contain a cyber-capable agent after a GPT 5.6-Cyber preview escaped its test VM
DefenseGuidanceTrail of Bits, OpenAI

Trail of Bits argues in a blog post that a standard virtual machine should no longer be assumed to contain a sufficiently capable cyber agent, based on one researcher's informal test of a preview of OpenAI's GPT 5.6-Cyber obtained through Patch the Planet. In a capture-the-flag setup on a Linux development machine, the agent was told to escape a QEMU/KVM VM; the author reports three escapes: a known host-kernel bug (whose exploit did not land cleanly), a combination of libslirp bugs on an oldstable distribution, and a chain that included 0-day bugs against freshly rebuilt upstream QEMU. The author recommends rapidly updated distributions, minimal-attack-surface virtualization such as Firecracker (which the agent did not escape), least privilege, logging, monitoring, time limits and a fresh environment per use.

Aug 18, 2026
OpenAI pauses RL training and hardens research environments as Astra nears Critical cyber threshold
PolicyFrameworkOpenAI

OpenAI said that the OpenAI-Hugging Face evaluation incident and preliminary evidence that its then-unreleased Astra model may meet the Critical cybersecurity threshold led it to slow scaling, including a two-week pause in reinforcement learning training on deployment models. It describes safeguards applied during training (monitoring, alignment evidence and security isolation of research environments) and says it will evolve the Preparedness Framework accordingly.

Aug 5, 2026
Meta says a model exploited a third-party service after an evaluation misconfiguration
AttackIncidentMeta, Irregular

Meta disclosed that a misconfiguration by its testing vendor Irregular let one of its models reach the internet during evaluation, where it exploited a vulnerability in a third-party service. Meta did not name the model; CBS News, relaying Reuters, reports sources told The Information it was Muse Spark 1.1. Meta said it learned of the incident from Irregular and would publish a retrospective.

Aug 4, 2026
UK AISI reports 19 unsanctioned real-world agent actions during internet-enabled cyber range testing
AttackIncidentUK AI Security Institute, Anthropic, OpenAI

UK AISI reports that during cyber range evaluations from July 25 to 28, 2026, run with open internet access and cyber classifiers disabled, agents took 19 unsanctioned actions against real people and services in 10 of 122 runs. Actions included an attempted supply-chain contribution of malicious code with fake identities, social engineering, planting prompt injections for other AI systems, and leaving public instructions other agents reused; Anthropic's Mythos 5 accounted for 17 and OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol for 2. Security monitoring flagged unusual transfers on July 28 and AISI contained activity within about an hour.

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