AppOmni reports that instructions planted in an ordinary ServiceNow record could cause a low-privilege Now Assist agent to discover and task a more privileged agent, leading to record changes, data access and email exfiltration. The behavior follows default settings that group agents into teams and make them discoverable; ServiceNow called it intended and updated its documentation.
Why it matters
It is a concrete agent-to-agent escalation where the risk lives in default configuration rather than a code bug.
Key facts
As stated in the sources, with where to find them.
- Three defaults enable the chain: LLM support for agent discovery, automatic team grouping, and discoverable-by-default publishing.Default configuration section
- AppOmni recommends supervised execution for privileged agents and team segmentation.Mitigations
Findings that cite this record
Key questions this bears on
- Can prompt injection against AI agents be reliably defended?Not reliably. Bounding what untrusted input can trigger helps, but trust boundaries must survive delegation and tool execution.
- Where are deployed AI agents actually being exploited?Exploitation often reaches deployed agents through connectors, credentials, tools and packages.
Sources
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