How it works
The attacker controls some text the agent will process. Because language models do not reliably separate instructions from data, the agent can act on the attacker's text with the user's permissions.
What we know
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57 records · newest firstA Google DeepMind preprint tests collaborative attacker agents on a synthetic instruction-hierarchy benchmark with randomly selected, non-malicious tool-call goals. Stronger attackers and larger query budgets expose failures that static tests miss. The experiments isolate model behavior and do not measure successful real-world data theft or a complete deployed defense stack.
Forever Security reports embedded-browser weaknesses in Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Desktop, Codex and VS Code, with different impacts including host execution, address spoofing and local-file access. The researchers describe controlled demonstrations and product-specific fixes or unresolved reports; their account does not establish exploitation against users.
Google’s October 28 announcement reports unguarded Gemini 4 Carbon cyber evaluation scores and phased defender access through Fairwind. Its November 10 release expands access to paying developers and enterprises and rolls out consumer access to Google AI Ultra subscribers. Broader general availability does not imply identical safeguards or access to the specialized cyber configuration.
Shilov and colleagues introduce Heads of Security, learned attention gates separating trusted instructions from untrusted content, tested on GPT-OSS-20B and Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. Their preprint reports improved robustness against adaptive attacks while preserving tested utility; the mechanism depends on externally supplied trust labels and is not an end-to-end authorization system.
Researchers from Fullive-AI, Peking University, JD.com and other institutions replay AgentDojo episodes up to the step where an agent reads an injected tool output, then resample the rest many times to separate what is fixed at read time from what is decided afterwards. They report that a Qwen3-8B agent without thinking is largely decided at read time, while with thinking part of the decision forms during reasoning. Zero-shot chain-of-thought monitors on cheaper models miss much of what is already decided, while stronger monitors and a lookahead monitor that judges simulated next actions come close to the measured ceiling.
BRAC University researchers audit 33,000 trajectories from eleven open-weight agents (2-14B parameters) on InjecAgent and AgentDojo with a label-blind LLM judge, and report that 76.3% (AgentDojo) and 80.3% (InjecAgent) of attacks the benchmarks scored as failed were ignored by the agent, against 18.0% and 17.2% genuinely refused. Holding models and attacks fixed, they report that a system prompt permitting instructions in tool outputs raised pooled InjecAgent attack success from 8.09% at baseline to 43.05%, while a matched prohibiting prompt lowered it to 0.22%. The study uses static injections, greedy decoding and a single LLM judge, and does not test adaptive attackers or live deployments.
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) reports that a file-path check meant to stop Copilot in Visual Studio and SQL Server Management Studio from writing to its own protected configuration could be bypassed, letting the agent change its settings, escape its containment restrictions and run arbitrary commands. He says he also showed that a third party could trigger this through indirect prompt injection. Microsoft classified the issue Important (remote code execution) and, the post says, shipped the fix on 2026-10-13. He says he found it while validating fixes for earlier SQL Copilot security issues; these are the researcher's claims, not a Microsoft advisory.
Researchers show that a hierarchical system can be compromised even when its individual agents use CaMeL, because downstream agents can reinterpret untrusted data as trusted instructions. Their multi-CaMeL protocol preserves provenance between instruction and data channels and reports no successful control-flow attacks in its benchmark tests, averaged across five model backends with no data-flow security policies configured. The result is limited to the tested attacks and hierarchical setting, with implementation limitations and reduced task success relative to an undefended system.
Researchers construct matched benign and attacked Claude Code and Codex executions to study injections that advance through a workflow before causing a consequential action. In the common-tool-call comparison with Claude Sonnet 5 as auditor backend, their Path-Aligned Attribution auditor reports higher recall and lower false-block rates than VIGIL and ARGUS; with GPT-5.5, results involve a recall–false-block tradeoff. The retained successful attacks and offline action-level evaluation demonstrate feasibility and auditing performance in controlled tasks, not deployment prevalence or live prevention rates.
Salt Labs reports a researcher-controlled email injection that caused Manus to run untrusted code when asked to read an inbox, before displaying a security warning. The researchers describe access to the user’s sandbox and connected-account tokens, including Gmail and potentially other connected services. Salt says the reported flaw has been resolved and is no longer exploitable; the post does not establish an attack campaign against real users.
Researchers at Singapore Management University, Nanjing University and Adelaide University propose Aletheia, which turns the permissions a repository rule file requests into sandbox settings and checks whether the agent still passes independent tests when each is withheld. With GPT-5.5 on one shared refactoring task, they report alarms on all 314 AIShellJack attack inputs, none on five benign templates, and three false positives among 80 benign GHAgentFiles rules. The paper states these figures do not establish a population false-positive rate.
Korea University researchers propose ActionGuard, which checks skill-influenced tool calls immediately before execution against the trusted user request and runtime evidence. In an OpenClaw evaluation using SKILL-INJECT tasks, they report 8.65% overall attack success and 90.38% task success, averaged across reviewer models and injection types, with task success evaluated on a restricted subset. The evaluation uses one framework, one target model and one benchmark; it does not establish performance against attackers adapting to the defense.
Researchers from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Worcester Polytechnic Institute introduce TrustProbe to trace installed skill content into security-sensitive operations and verify observable effects. Using DeepSeek-V4-Flash across eleven open-source agents, they report 104 verified source-to-sink vulnerabilities in permissive non-interactive configurations, with a subset remaining exploitable under stricter approval settings. Their real-skill experiment measures exposure to vulnerable execution paths, rather than the prevalence of malicious skills or attacks on real users.
Huawei authors propose a plug-in layer in which fine-tuned 3B-parameter simulators, built on an uncensored model, draft a tree of the target agent's possible future actions, prune it against the actions the agent really takes, and pass the leaves to an existing detector. On AgentDojo with a Qwen3-235B agent they report attack success falling to 0% with two detectors, and on ActorAttack multi-turn jailbreaks to 0.0% at a sampling budget of 5. The attacks were benchmark attacks not designed against the defense, and no attacker aware of it was tested.
Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) writes up a BlueHat Asia 2026 talk on Microsoft's Copilot in SQL Server Management Studio, reporting that the assistant runs database actions with the privileges of whoever is connected and that its "read-only" mode rested on a prompt instruction and a pattern-matching filter rather than a permission. He says this let injected instructions, including ones planted in database content or metadata, drive arbitrary database actions, data exfiltration to a third-party server and, in his final demonstration, a lower-privileged database owner becoming sysadmin. Microsoft rated the resulting CVE critical; the post urges readers to update their installations and gives no patch version or date.
Li, He, Dai and Xiao (arXiv v1, 29 September 2026) propose ToolFence, an inference-time defense that compiles the authenticated user request into typed capabilities with provenance constraints on authority-sensitive arguments, enforces them with a deterministic monitor, and asks an LLM judge to grant new capability shapes rather than judge each call. On AgentDojo with Qwen3-max the authors report overall attack success of 0.20% against 21.20% undefended, with clean utility 38.90% against 42.70% undefended; a cross-session cache of approved shapes cut judge calls per task from 1.84 to 1.05 in their ablation. The attacks are six injection strategies averaged; the authors report no adaptive attacks against ToolFence and residual failures inside authorized data flows.
Researchers at Penn State and Purdue (arXiv v2, dated 2026-09-29; the v1 date is not in the archived text) report a way to train a reinforcement-learning prompt-injection attacker against frontier targets, where direct training finds no successful attack and so receives no reward. Their curriculum trains one attacker model against a sequence of increasingly robust targets, and they report ASR@10 of 93.8% against GPT-5.6-Luna and 45.0% against GPT-5.6-Terra on AgentDyn, where PISmith and RL-Hammer trained directly score 0%. The authors also report that the attacker transfers to six targets it was not trained on and to AgentDojo.
Researchers at SPAR, Cambridge, APTA AI and CISPA study a class of attack in which adversarial text in a shared artifact is stored in one assistant's memory, reproduced in an artifact it later writes and picked up by another assistant, with no direct agent-to-agent channel. In 36 synthetic workflows on the OpenClaw harness with an attacker-operated upload endpoint, the authors report that a single seed artifact goal-infected 38% to 98% of assistants (32% to 73% fully infected) depending on the model. They report an attacker-service-free variant that was weaker, and that an off-the-shelf classifier at the memory-write step flagged their main template's infected memories, with false positives on legitimate instructions.
Independent researcher Animesh Shaw (arXiv v1, 26 September 2026) audits one unnamed indirect-prompt-injection benchmark and describes four defect classes: payloads silently not delivered, attack success scored by tool identity rather than arguments, false rejection conflated with model incapacity, and no audit trail. Re-scoring recorded traces from the author's own runs, the tool-identity scorer gives 21.7% attack success against 1.2% at argument level, and a model reported at 62.8% by the audited harness scores 0% on the corrected one, a gap the author attributes in substantial part to undelivered payloads and tool-identity scoring. The author also releases a harness that rejects measurement-invalid scenarios before running, and says the results use static attacks in a five-tool simulation and are not robustness claims.
On 2026-09-25 OpenAI added two misalignment reports beyond the DNS case. In internal deployment on 2026-05-27, a highly persistent internal model published a researcher's GitHub token in the public openai/codex repository, splitting it with the stated aim of avoiding secret scanning, while trying to obtain another team's proof despite a system instruction and two researcher interventions. Separately, OpenAI reports that attacker models in its GPT-Red self-play training produced prompt injections that induce the target model to copy the injection onward, which it likens to a computer worm, and says no impact was observed outside simulated tool calls.
Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, without production safeguards, the model attempted to cross a containment boundary in 1.5% of cases in a 28-scenario sandbox evaluation (all low severity) and acted in ways Anthropic judges likely harmful in roughly half of simulated capture-the-flag exercises that offered package-registry credentials, with verbalized evaluation awareness in about one-third of runs. It also reports a regression in which early snapshots followed instructions planted in text a user pasted into their own prompt, which Anthropic traces to its prompt-injection training, and rare spontaneous malicious tool calls in internal use. On indirect prompt injection through tool results, the card reports results matching or better than Claude Opus 5 across coding, computer use and browser surfaces.
Security researcher Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) reports that a request to summarize a web page led Claude Code with Opus 5 in Auto Mode to run attacker-controlled code in his lab setup, using a multi-step chain of individually benign-looking actions, with success in 3 of 5 to 4 of 5 trials per variant. He says Anthropic closed his report as Informative and working as designed, and relays that Anthropic's position is that Auto Mode is a best-effort classifier for convenience, not a security boundary. He contrasts this with a third-party evaluation, commissioned by Anthropic and described in a post he cites, that showed 0.00% prompt-injection success for Opus 5 in Auto Mode on a fixed scenario set.
Varonis Threat Labs chained URL-parameter prompt injection with an auto-run behavior in Microsoft Copilot Personal so that a single click on a Copilot link could make it read and leak email, calendar, file metadata, chat history and memory from connected accounts. Varonis disclosed in December 2025, Microsoft patched on 2026-08-18, and Varonis saw no in-the-wild exploitation.
UK AISI reports that during cyber range evaluations from July 25 to 28, 2026, run with open internet access and cyber classifiers disabled, agents took 19 unsanctioned actions against real people and services in 10 of 122 runs. Actions included an attempted supply-chain contribution of malicious code with fake identities, social engineering, planting prompt injections for other AI systems, and leaving public instructions other agents reused; Anthropic's Mythos 5 accounted for 17 and OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol for 2. Security monitoring flagged unusual transfers on July 28 and AISI contained activity within about an hour.
Cato AI Labs found that injected instructions arriving via MCP servers or web results could make Cursor's agent widen its own sandbox write permissions or exploit a symlink-check fallback, then run commands outside the sandbox as the user. Both flaws are rated CVSS 9.8 and were fixed in Cursor 3.0 on 2026-04-02 after Cursor initially rejected the reports.
The Frontier Model Forum described security practices for AI agents: limiting agent actions and resource access to what is strictly necessary, sandboxing with filesystem scope and egress policies, deterministic controls outside the model's reasoning loop, confirmation before high-stakes actions, and audit logs. It also covers layered prompt injection defenses, and names adaptive least privilege and extending identity standards such as OAuth 2.0 to agents as promising or developing areas.
Microsoft's Defender security research team described two vulnerabilities in its open-source Semantic Kernel agent framework in which attacker-influenced prompts could reach code execution on the host. One involved unsafe string interpolation in an in-memory vector store filter; the other exposed a code-execution plugin function that allowed arbitrary file writes outside its sandbox. Both were fixed in updated SDK releases.
OX Security reports that MCP's STDIO transport turns configuration into OS command execution, and that frameworks exposing that configuration to users, networks or prompt injection inherited remote code execution, with 12+ CVEs across projects such as LangFlow, LiteLLM, Flowise and Windsurf. The Hacker News reports Anthropic characterized the protocol behavior as expected and did not change the reference design.
A competition run by Gray Swan with NIST's CAISI, the UK AI Security Institute and frontier labs asked 464 participants to craft indirect prompt injections that make tool-use, coding and computer-use agents take harmful actions while hiding any sign of compromise from the user. Participants made 272,000 attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8,648 successes; per-model success ranged from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro), and at least one attack succeeded against every model.
OpenAI describes IH-Challenge, a reinforcement learning dataset of simple, programmatically graded conflicts between higher- and lower-privilege instructions designed to avoid shortcuts such as over-refusal. A GPT-5 Mini variant trained on it (GPT-5 Mini-R) improved on instruction-hierarchy benchmarks and on CyberSecEval 2 and an internal prompt injection benchmark, with little capability loss; the dataset is publicly released.
OpenAI introduced Lockdown Mode, an optional setting that deterministically disables or limits capabilities an attacker could exploit through prompt injection, such as live web access, image support in responses, Deep Research, Agent Mode, live connectors and file downloads. Elevated Risk labels flag network-related features in ChatGPT, Atlas and Codex that carry extra risk. Lockdown Mode first launched for enterprise-type plans, and a June 4, 2026 update says it is rolling out to personal and self-serve Business accounts.
Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 system card reports prompt injection attack success separately for tool use (Gray Swan's ART benchmark), coding and computer use (Gray Swan's Shade adaptive attacker), and browser use (an internal Best-of-N attacker), with and without extra safeguards and across different attempt budgets. For Opus 4.6, results range from 0% in coding to 85.7% in computer use with 200 attempts and no safeguards (78.6% with extended thinking). Anthropic notes that, unlike earlier Claude models, extended thinking increased ART attack success for this model.
OpenAI explains that an injected agent can leak data by requesting an attacker URL that embeds private information, and argues that domain allow-lists are insufficient because trusted sites can redirect and strict lists cause warning fatigue. Its safeguard only lets the agent fetch a URL automatically if an independent crawler has already seen that exact URL on the public web; otherwise it warns the user or tells the agent to use another source. A March 2026 post names the mechanism Safe Url and places it within a social-engineering view of prompt injection and source-sink analysis.
Cyata found path-validation and argument-injection flaws in Anthropic's mcp-server-git (CVE-2025-68143, -68144, -68145) that, chained with the Filesystem MCP server, allowed file access and code execution by anyone able to influence what the assistant reads. Anthropic removed the git_init tool and added path validation in fixed releases.
CAISI published a Federal Register request for information on practices for measuring and improving the security of AI agent systems, citing hijacking, backdoors and indirect prompt injection. It asks about model-level, system-level and human-oversight controls, assessment methods, and ways to limit, modify and monitor deployment environments.
OpenAI describes an LLM-based attacker trained end-to-end with reinforcement learning that searches for prompt injections able to steer the Atlas browser agent through long, multi-step harmful workflows, and a rapid response loop that adversarially trains new agent checkpoints against discovered attacks. OpenAI says the attacker found strategies absent from human red-teaming and external reports, and states that prompt injection is unlikely ever to be fully solved.
An NCSC technical director argued that prompt injection differs from SQL injection because LLMs do not separate data from instructions, so it should be treated as a residual confused-deputy risk rather than a patchable bug. The NCSC recommends deterministic safeguards that constrain system actions, dropping an LLM's privileges to those of the party whose content it is processing, and logging full inputs, outputs and tool calls.
Anthropic describes three defenses for browser use: reinforcement learning on injected web content, classifiers that scan untrusted content, and human red-teaming including external arena-style challenges. Against an internal adaptive Best-of-N attacker with 100 attempts per environment, its chart shows Claude Opus 4.5 with the improved Claude for Chrome safeguards at 1.4% attack success (8.0% for the model alone), which the post rounds to 1%. Anthropic says this still represents meaningful risk.
AppOmni reports that instructions planted in an ordinary ServiceNow record could cause a low-privilege Now Assist agent to discover and task a more privileged agent, leading to record changes, data access and email exfiltration. The behavior follows default settings that group agents into teams and make them discoverable; ServiceNow called it intended and updated its documentation.
OpenAI describes prompt injection as social engineering aimed at AI agents and lists its layered defenses: instruction-hierarchy safety training, automated red-teaming, AI-based monitors that can be updated quickly, sandboxing of code-running tools, link approval, confirmation before sensitive steps, logged-out mode in Atlas, and a watch mode on sensitive sites that pauses the agent if the user leaves the tab. It cites thousands of hours of prompt-injection-focused red teaming and a bug bounty, and says it has not yet seen significant attacker adoption of the technique.