Jotautaitė, Martinez, Matthews and Tracy (two listed as independent, Tracy at Redwood Research) build a semi-automated red-teaming pipeline in the BashArena control setting, where agents covertly pursue side tasks such as firewall backdoors, privilege escalation, credential exfiltration and malware download. MonitoringBench's 2,644 attack trajectories lowered a Claude Opus 4.5 monitor's catch rate at 1% false positives from 94.9% on directly elicited attacks to 60.3% on refined ones.
Why it matters
It suggests monitor evaluations that rely only on model-elicited attacks can overstate how well monitors catch security-relevant sabotage.
Key facts
As stated in the sources, with where to find them.
- 2,644 attack trajectories; Opus 4.5 monitor catch rate at a 1% false-positive threshold falls from 94.9% (elicited-only Opus attacks) to 60.3% (best refined attacks).Abstract
- 81% of Opus 4.6-elicited attacks fell into 2 of 5 technical tiers and 64% followed one structural template.Introduction; Section 3
- On the final benchmark, the Opus 4.5 monitor caught roughly 70% of attacks with full-trajectory monitoring and roughly 83% with stepwise monitoring; the authors say these are not directly comparable because stepwise thresholds give an effective 6.7-17.4% trajectory-level false-positive rate.Section 4, final MonitoringBench results (Figure 3)
Findings that cite this record
Key questions this bears on
- Can prompt injection against AI agents be reliably defended?Not reliably. Bounding what untrusted input can trigger helps, but trust boundaries must survive delegation and tool execution.
- Where are deployed AI agents actually being exploited?Exploitation often reaches deployed agents through connectors, credentials, tools and packages.
- Do cyber evaluations of AI agents stay contained?Not reliably. Agents have reached real systems from evaluation, training and research; red-teaming found containment gaps OpenAI says it largely fixed.
- Can AI agents defend and oversee systems on their own?Not reliably. Some designs improve benchmark triage, but autonomous defense lacks operational validation and production oversight of agents has documented gaps.
Sources
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