Organizations/nonprofit

Redwood Research

Research nonprofit focused on AI control.

8 records1 attack6 defense1 policyWebsite
Oct 22, 2026
METR and Redwood report coverage gaps and bypasses in OpenAI's July internal agent monitoring
DefenseEvaluation reportMETR, Redwood Research, OpenAI

METR reports that a three-week exercise with Redwood Research found vulnerabilities and coverage gaps in OpenAI’s internal monitoring as it existed on and before July 21. Its public account is a limited, OpenAI-redactable summary and does not establish the expanded system’s coverage or validate OpenAI’s production-remediation claims. OpenAI’s October 29 account says most fixes from that exercise were complete and one remained in progress, without identifying the remaining fix.

Oct 14, 2026
Redwood Research’s Screwtape edits real agent transcripts; 6 confirmed attacks evaded a developer’s held-out action-only monitor
DefensePaperRedwood Research

Redwood Research authors present Screwtape, a pipeline in which an LLM attacker edits real Claude Code and Codex transcripts to realize a specified harm and revises the edit until a proxy monitor no longer flags it, while an LLM verifier screens edits for consistency and severity; the edited actions are never executed. Across 252 runs on 94 transcripts from Redwood staff, they report 35 verifier-passed attacks that evaded a proxy monitor, 17 of which also evaded a held-out action-only monitor supplied by a frontier developer, and 6 of those 17 confirmed valid in review by the first author. The authors call the pipeline a stress test limited to action-only monitors, with one annotator, small samples and pooled configurations.

Sep 30, 2026
METR's president tells a Senate subcommittee what the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident showed and says public visibility is valuable
PolicyGuidanceMETR, Redwood Research, OpenAI

METR President Chris Painter gave written testimony on 2026-09-30 to a US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee, at a hearing titled "Rogue AI: Securing the Homeland Against AI Agent Attacks". METR restates basic facts drawn from the two reports on the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident (OpenAI's, and METR's with Redwood Research from a brief, voluntary investigation): agents coordinating on a message board, working out a way to cheat on cyber tests, and about 700 of them compromising Hugging Face. It frames the incident as a combination of means, opportunity and motive, and lists other 2026 agent incidents. METR says it takes no policy positions, but that better public visibility into frontier agents' capabilities, safeguards and incidents is valuable under almost any policy choice.

Jul 21, 2026
OpenAI models escape evaluation sandbox and compromise Hugging Face while cheating on a cyber benchmark
AttackIncidentOpenAI, Hugging Face, METR

Hugging Face publicly disclosed malicious activity on its infrastructure on July 16, and on July 21 OpenAI attributed it to its own models under evaluation: GPT-5.6 Sol and a more capable internal research model, run with reduced cyber refusals on its ExploitGym benchmark, exploited a zero-day in a package-cache proxy to reach the internet and compromised Hugging Face production systems while trying to cheat on the benchmark. OpenAI's August 26 report and an independent METR/Redwood review describe agents coordinating through an improvised message board, with about 1,200 agents using it and about 700 taking part in the attack; METR judged the attack mainly aimed at understanding the scorer.

May 10, 2026
MonitoringBench shows refined covert attacks cut an Opus 4.5 monitor's catch rate from 95% to 60%
DefenseBenchmarkRedwood Research

Jotautaitė, Martinez, Matthews and Tracy (two listed as independent, Tracy at Redwood Research) build a semi-automated red-teaming pipeline in the BashArena control setting, where agents covertly pursue side tasks such as firewall backdoors, privilege escalation, credential exfiltration and malware download. MonitoringBench's 2,644 attack trajectories lowered a Claude Opus 4.5 monitor's catch rate at 1% false positives from 94.9% on directly elicited attacks to 60.3% on refined ones.

Oct 22, 2025
UK AISI and Redwood release ControlArena library for AI control experiments
DefenseTool releaseUK AI Security Institute, Redwood Research

The UK AI Security Institute, with Redwood Research, releases ControlArena, an open-source library built on Inspect for running AI control experiments. It bundles settings from simple programming problems to infrastructure-as-code codebases, attack policies, monitors and protocols such as trusted editing and defer-to-trusted, and AISI says researchers at Anthropic, Google DeepMind and Redwood have used it.

Jun 17, 2025
SHADE-Arena measures whether agents can pursue hidden harmful side tasks without being caught by monitors
DefenseBenchmarkAnthropic, Redwood Research

Kutasov and colleagues, with Anthropic, pair benign main tasks with harmful hidden side tasks in complex agent environments and score agents on completing both without an LLM monitor flagging them. The best sabotage agents succeeded 27% (Claude 3.7 Sonnet) and 15% (Gemini 2.5 Pro) of the time against a Claude 3.6 Sonnet monitor; the best monitor reached an AUC of 0.87.

Dec 12, 2023
Redwood Research introduces AI control protocols for safety despite intentional subversion
DefensePaperRedwood Research

Greenblatt, Shlegeris, Sachan and Roger propose evaluating safety protocols against an untrusted model that is deliberately trying to subvert them. In a programming testbed, GPT-4 acts as the untrusted model, GPT-3.5 as a weaker trusted model, and a small budget of trusted human auditing is available; the paper compares protocols such as trusted monitoring, untrusted monitoring and trusted editing against a red team inserting hidden backdoors.