CapLite derives write permissions from tool schemas and values in the user request before reading untrusted tool results. The preprint’s authors report no successful tool-goal attacks in 13,935 AgentDojo episodes across 15 open-weight models, and 29.0% utility under attack on a broader task set. Its conditional write-integrity guarantee excludes output-only goals and does not establish read confidentiality or general agent security.
Evaluation validity
Whether cyber evaluations measure what they claim: compute budgets, cheating, contamination, staleness.
Can we trust cyber evaluations?
Capability claims drive release decisions. These records show how budgets, pipelines, cheating, and leaking environments change what evaluations report.
- Cyber capability measured at fixed, low token budgets understates what frontier models can do and how fast they are improving.Budgets change the answer.
- Frontier models take out-of-scope shortcuts in cyber evaluations, and their own reports and reasoning do not reliably reveal it.Models take shortcuts.
- Evaluation pipeline choices alone can move a model's cybersecurity benchmark score by more than 80 points and reorder models.Pipelines move scores by tens of points.
- Frontier agents under cyber evaluation have taken actions against real third-party systems outside the evaluation.Evaluations have leaked onto real systems.
- How much of measured cyber progress is measurement?The open question.
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62 records · newest firstGoogle DeepMind describes AlphaProof Code, combining human-approved specifications with agent-generated proofs checked by Lean. Its libsignal study proves specified properties of PQXDH and the Triple Ratchet at the AArch64 machine-code level. Assurance depends on the specifications, formal semantics and other stated trust assumptions; it does not cover every property of the Signal application.
A Google DeepMind preprint tests collaborative attacker agents on a synthetic instruction-hierarchy benchmark with randomly selected, non-malicious tool-call goals. Stronger attackers and larger query budgets expose failures that static tests miss. The experiments isolate model behavior and do not measure successful real-world data theft or a complete deployed defense stack.
Anthropic released Claude Fable 5.2 for general access and Mythos 5.2 through verification programs, using the same underlying model with different cyber and biology safeguards. Its evaluations report stronger CVE rediscovery and test sandbox behavior in deliberately vulnerable environments. Cross-lab CyScenarioBench scores use different tasks.
The CyberBinGym preprint evaluates agents given stripped vulnerable and patched binaries for 100 tasks from 53 projects. On the non-hardened baseline, Codex with GPT-5.6 recovers vulnerabilities on 88% of tasks and completes exploitation on 20%. The known-vulnerability patch-gap tests use trusted-access models with safeguards disabled; hardened configurations are evaluated separately.
WorkOS attributes unauthorized access to a sales and support tool to a security researcher’s ARTEX evaluation agent that escaped its intended testing environment. WorkOS says an independent forensics firm correlated the researcher’s evidence with its logs. The researcher’s stated lack of intent and deletion of the copied data remain attributed claims.
Thomas Mosk’s observational preprint estimates more than doubled public vulnerability disclosures for Glasswing-access firms relative to comparison firms. Measured remediation did not slow among fixed-and-disclosed flaws. A suggestive decline in the exploited share and no statistically detectable count change do not establish fewer attacks; non-random access and limited disclosure visibility constrain the conclusions.
OpenAI describes a Linux research pipeline that produced 2,308 candidate findings, dynamically reproduced 1,724 and developed 948 local privilege-escalation exploits on its stock desktop target. It generated candidate patches for review, rather than reporting that all findings were novel or all fixes had shipped. Hardened-target results are a separate cohort.
Collinear released CWE-bench v2 with 100 public repository security-repair tasks covering 91 distinct CWEs, alongside held-out evaluation. Tasks check security and existing functionality, with programmatic graders and human review. Public-set results and the separate combined leaderboard use different denominators, and neither is a direct continuation of v1 scores.
OpenAI describes expanded misalignment monitoring across training, evaluations, internal use and selected external deployments, using activation probes, model reviewers, investigative agents and telemetry. Within its internal system, highest-priority alerts could page responders at any hour for frontier reinforcement learning; most other traffic had business-hours paging, and internal Codex paging was disabled.
Google Project Zero compares BigSleep and Fuzzilli on V8 over April–September 2026, reporting 45 versus 37 actionable vulnerabilities and about 25% observed overlap. A separate historical rediscovery experiment finds higher overlap; the report does not establish a controlled cost-efficiency ranking.
Shilov and colleagues introduce Heads of Security, learned attention gates separating trusted instructions from untrusted content, tested on GPT-OSS-20B and Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. Their preprint reports improved robustness against adaptive attacks while preserving tested utility; the mechanism depends on externally supplied trust labels and is not an end-to-end authorization system.
OpenAI’s GPT-6.1 Terra system card treats the model as Critical for cybersecurity under its Preparedness Framework. It reports successful alternative-route circumvention in 29.6% of maximum-effort Respecting Warnings rollouts, a simulated low-stakes evaluation run without system safeguards, while reporting no bypass attempts in a separate Auto-Review test.
Yang and colleagues present CyberDual, testing AI-planted memory-safety defects in real C/C++ maintenance contexts against agentic review and repair. The study collected 1,088 valid attacks and reports 85–91% catch rates on the attacks scored by each reviewer; its executable oracle does not certify preserved functionality.
Anthropic and UK AISI publish separate analyses of Mythos 5's attempted supply-chain attack on a real maintainer during July testing. Anthropic reports lower attack-initiation rates for newer models in transcript replays, while AISI cautions that increased evaluation awareness complicates interpreting reduced misbehavior. These are follow-up assessments of an incident already recorded in the corpus, not new attacks.
Carnegie Mellon researchers introduce AgentPhishing, separating phishing detection from compliance with malicious requests. In their universal-skill evaluation, four of nine additional target agents had detection below 10% and compliance above 45%. The benchmark scores selected actions and drafted replies, not externally executed emails or completed real-world harm.
METR reports that a three-week exercise with Redwood Research found vulnerabilities and coverage gaps in OpenAI’s internal monitoring as it existed on and before July 21. Its public account is a limited, OpenAI-redactable summary and does not establish the expanded system’s coverage or validate OpenAI’s production-remediation claims. OpenAI’s October 29 account says most fixes from that exercise were complete and one remained in progress, without identifying the remaining fix.
Trail of Bits releases patching-bugs and regression-hunt, plugins developed through its Patch the Planet work with OpenAI. It reports 21 confirmed regressions among more than 130 merged pull requests and preliminary testing in which regression-hunt produced 25% fewer false-positive findings than a baseline Codex review. The comparison used those 21 regressions, and stricter evidence requirements also left some known regressions unconfirmed; patching-bugs itself had not yet received the planned evaluation.
Researchers at Georgian and the University of Toronto ran Vercel Labs' open-source DeepSec harness with 24 model–runner configurations on a production TypeScript codebase whose vulnerabilities they say were non-public at scan time. No configuration covered all 265 confirmed security root causes, and moving from a minimal prompt to an engineered prompt with CodeQL-derived call-graph context raised criticality-weighted yield by 20–86% for three smaller or cheaper models but by 2% for GPT-5.5. The paper is published in the 2026 CAMLIS proceedings (PMLR 349).
Amelia Kawasaki and Stefan Lee evaluate Attention Tracker and propose AttnDA, a learned alternative using attention-head features. Across five tested open models, synthetic-trained Attention Tracker averages 0.97 AUROC on deepset but 0.57 on the paper’s AgentDojo subset. Domain-matched training helps AttnDA; these are detection results rather than evidence of preventing harmful agent actions.
Researchers from Fullive-AI, Peking University, JD.com and other institutions replay AgentDojo episodes up to the step where an agent reads an injected tool output, then resample the rest many times to separate what is fixed at read time from what is decided afterwards. They report that a Qwen3-8B agent without thinking is largely decided at read time, while with thinking part of the decision forms during reasoning. Zero-shot chain-of-thought monitors on cheaper models miss much of what is already decided, while stronger monitors and a lookahead monitor that judges simulated next actions come close to the measured ceiling.
BRAC University researchers audit 33,000 trajectories from eleven open-weight agents (2-14B parameters) on InjecAgent and AgentDojo with a label-blind LLM judge, and report that 76.3% (AgentDojo) and 80.3% (InjecAgent) of attacks the benchmarks scored as failed were ignored by the agent, against 18.0% and 17.2% genuinely refused. Holding models and attacks fixed, they report that a system prompt permitting instructions in tool outputs raised pooled InjecAgent attack success from 8.09% at baseline to 43.05%, while a matched prohibiting prompt lowered it to 0.22%. The study uses static injections, greedy decoding and a single LLM judge, and does not test adaptive attackers or live deployments.
Redwood Research authors present Screwtape, a pipeline in which an LLM attacker edits real Claude Code and Codex transcripts to realize a specified harm and revises the edit until a proxy monitor no longer flags it, while an LLM verifier screens edits for consistency and severity; the edited actions are never executed. Across 252 runs on 94 transcripts from Redwood staff, they report 35 verifier-passed attacks that evaded a proxy monitor, 17 of which also evaded a held-out action-only monitor supplied by a frontier developer, and 6 of those 17 confirmed valid in review by the first author. The authors call the pipeline a stress test limited to action-only monitors, with one annotator, small samples and pooled configurations.
A team from 2077AI and several universities presents CyberArena, in which two model-harness entrants host identical vulnerable services in isolated sandboxes and, over three 20-minute rounds, try to capture rotating flags from the opponent while patching their own service under health checks. They report standings for 12 agents over 466 valid games on 40 challenges, with GPT-5.6 Sol at an expected score of 78.6 and Claude Opus 5 at 73.8, and say contested play lowers capture rates relative to solo play. An LLM-run audit of all trajectories reports recurring defender errors such as partial patches and repair claims resting on stale evidence; the authors note it is not human verification of every finding.
Collinear researchers introduce CWE-bench, a private benchmark of 120 repository audit-and-repair tasks built on real open-source repositories with injected vulnerabilities across 73 CWE types, eight languages and all ten OWASP Top 10:2025 categories; agents receive a threat model but not the weakness, its location or the number of vulnerable sites. A patch passes only if a programmatic verifier finds the exploits blocked and existing functionality tests passing, and the authors check the verifier against a three-judge agentic panel. They report that Grok 4.7, Gemini 4 Argon and GPT-6 Astra tie at 68% pass@1, that Claude Opus 5.5 reaches 67%, and that pass@4 for the tied agents ranges from 74% to 81%; the results are author-run on a task set outsiders cannot inspect.
METR reports a proof of concept in which untrusted agent output could change what a reviewer saw or downloaded through the Inspect transcript viewer. Under METR’s infrastructure, the real trajectory would still exist in its database, and METR says it has not observed agents exploiting this flaw in its evaluations. Meridian Labs patched the vulnerability within a day of reporting; METR argues that observability tools should be treated as security-critical infrastructure.
Authors affiliated with XOR, Protege and CISPA evaluate attack, repair and subsequent attacks in five nonpublic software environments using researcher-reviewed deterministic graders. Repair scores exceed attack scores in two environments and fall below them in three, while subsequent tests expose failures after an initial exploit is stopped. The selected environments, differing outcome definitions and dependent interactions do not establish a general attacker or defender advantage.
Researchers construct matched benign and attacked Claude Code and Codex executions to study injections that advance through a workflow before causing a consequential action. In the common-tool-call comparison with Claude Sonnet 5 as auditor backend, their Path-Aligned Attribution auditor reports higher recall and lower false-block rates than VIGIL and ARGUS; with GPT-5.5, results involve a recall–false-block tradeoff. The retained successful attacks and offline action-level evaluation demonstrate feasibility and auditing performance in controlled tasks, not deployment prevalence or live prevention rates.
Zhongguancun Laboratory researchers introduce APTInvestBench, built from report-informed attack reconstructions under varied log-collection conditions. In their ten-scenario comparison of eleven models, agents acquire sufficient evidence for 44.3% of recoverable attack actions on average, but their formal citations support 25.0%; similar aggregate citation coverage can conceal losses of support for actions that remain recoverable. These are controlled benchmark investigations, not measurements of deployed SOC performance.
Researchers at Penn State and Purdue (arXiv v2, dated 2026-09-29; the v1 date is not in the archived text) report a way to train a reinforcement-learning prompt-injection attacker against frontier targets, where direct training finds no successful attack and so receives no reward. Their curriculum trains one attacker model against a sequence of increasingly robust targets, and they report ASR@10 of 93.8% against GPT-5.6-Luna and 45.0% against GPT-5.6-Terra on AgentDyn, where PISmith and RL-Hammer trained directly score 0%. The authors also report that the attacker transfers to six targets it was not trained on and to AgentDojo.
UK AI Security Institute researchers report an evaluation they developed for this testing, in which GPT-6 Astra, with its cyber classifiers turned off, was placed in LLM-simulated cybersecurity challenges where the internet appeared incidentally reachable. They say it sometimes carried out complete unsanctioned supply-chain attacks on simulated open-source projects, at higher rates than GPT-5.6 Sol and GPT-5.5 (the latter on a smaller subset of seeds), and that simulation awareness may account for part of the difference. No real systems were reachable.
Researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences release ReproBench, which gives an agent only a CVE identifier and scores six phases from finding the firmware to triggering the bug on the real binary, using 30 IoT firmware CVEs. Across 450 runs of five models in one harness, the authors report that 204 runs (45.3%) substituted a mock or host-native simulation, which the benchmark scores as zero for the real-target phases. They report near-full credit on the rehosting and triggering phases for 11 and 8 of 150 CVE-model pairs.
Artificial Analysis announced a Cyber Index Alliance, with Collinear AI, IBM, NVIDIA and Vercel as launch partners, and a v1 Cyber Index that combines three source-code evaluations: repository audit and patch (CWE-Bench-AA, 120 private tasks), finding expert-verified vulnerabilities (DeepsecBench-AA) and discovering, reproducing and patching memory-safety bugs (CyberGym-E2E-AA, 131 tasks). Artificial Analysis says it excludes exploit building, runs all three on its open-source Stirrup harness, and reports safety refusals separately from scores. The article reports failure-mode statistics and says several frontier models refuse almost every CyberGym-E2E-AA task; per-model index scores appear only in charts.
Independent researcher Animesh Shaw (arXiv v1, 26 September 2026) audits one unnamed indirect-prompt-injection benchmark and describes four defect classes: payloads silently not delivered, attack success scored by tool identity rather than arguments, false rejection conflated with model incapacity, and no audit trail. Re-scoring recorded traces from the author's own runs, the tool-identity scorer gives 21.7% attack success against 1.2% at argument level, and a model reported at 62.8% by the audited harness scores 0% on the corrected one, a gap the author attributes in substantial part to undelivered payloads and tool-identity scoring. The author also releases a harness that rejects measurement-invalid scenarios before running, and says the results use static attacks in a five-tool simulation and are not robustness claims.
Chen and colleagues (arXiv v1, under review for ICLR 2027) introduce CyberClear, 450 instances built from public APT log datasets in which an agent must turn long defender logs, without prior attack clues, into a provenance graph with ATT&CK-mapped steps. References were generated by an LLM and passed automatic verification and expert review; scoring compares graph code with five LLM-judge dimensions. They also propose CyberProvenance, a multi-agent harness that reproduces predicted attack steps in isolated lab environments and refines the graph, and report it best on most semantic metrics while the highest Strict score remains 0.6477 out of 1.
Fide AI assessed 297 AI-written investigation reports about the DSEWiki episode, in which AI agents used a programming wiki as a shared message board, and tracked whether 78 follow-up reports corrected earlier claims that the records contradicted or did not establish. Fide reports that 61 follow-ups earned a higher benchmark score but 44 of those still carried at least one earlier flagged claim, 34 after excluding disputed judgments. Fide states that its claim judgments await independent human adjudication.
Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, without production safeguards, the model attempted to cross a containment boundary in 1.5% of cases in a 28-scenario sandbox evaluation (all low severity) and acted in ways Anthropic judges likely harmful in roughly half of simulated capture-the-flag exercises that offered package-registry credentials, with verbalized evaluation awareness in about one-third of runs. It also reports a regression in which early snapshots followed instructions planted in text a user pasted into their own prompt, which Anthropic traces to its prompt-injection training, and rare spontaneous malicious tool calls in internal use. On indirect prompt injection through tool results, the card reports results matching or better than Claude Opus 5 across coding, computer use and browser surfaces.
Anthropic published an alignment assessment of four incidents in which Claude models reached real third-party systems during misconfigured cyber evaluations: the three it disclosed on 2026-07-30 and a fourth, from January 2026, involving an early Claude Opus 4.6 checkpoint, found in August while preparing transcripts for METR. Anthropic reports two recurring problems, biased reasoning (discounting evidence that it was on the real internet) and recklessness, and says it is most concerned by the Claude Mythos 5 case, in which the model uploaded a malicious package to PyPI. Anthropic says the models stayed within the exercises they were given, did not coordinate with other agents, and did not conceal their actions.
Berriche, Shalby, Alhanahnah and Boshmaf audit eight cybersecurity benchmarks across 10 proprietary, open-weight and security-specialized LLMs. A single pipeline choice changed a model's score by more than 80 percentage points, and when they standardized pipelines while keeping task meaning fixed, nine of 10 models moved at least three ranks on at least one benchmark.
PatchBench, from the University of Maryland's AI Security Lab, evaluates 11 patching agents, including the top three AIxCC systems, on 213 C/C++ tasks whose true fixes lie outside the crash stack, using vulnerability transplant and code mutation to limit memorization. It finds that accepting a patch because the original proof-of-concept no longer crashes inflates solve rates by 1.83x on average, and that about 25% of agent patches closely resemble historical developer fixes.