JFrog reports 42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners linked to the testmetest npm campaign. Recovered artifacts included malicious publishers and execution hooks for Claude, Gemini, Cursor and VS Code; repository counts do not establish the number of infected developer machines or downstream executions.
Why it matters
It documents agent and IDE configuration becoming an execution surface within a broader software supply-chain compromise.
Key facts
As stated in the sources, with where to find them.
- JFrog identified 42 armed repositories after enumerating owner repositories and inspecting trees and blobs. Oversized payloads escaped normal code-search and content-API paths; the 42 are the identified armed repositories, not the total population searched.42 armed repositories hiding in plain sight
- Snapshot metadata in an attacker-owned repository did not reveal victim identities, affected-system counts or plaintext contents. Recovered publisher code establishes intended automation, not execution of every release.The exfiltration decoy became a live data sink; The hidden ci.js publisher
- The investigators distinguish malicious releases from benign campaign-associated versions and do not establish that the original Miasma operators were responsible.Introduction; Package classifications
Findings that cite this record
No tracked finding cites this record yet.
Key questions this bears on
- Where are deployed AI agents actually being exploited?Mostly around the model: connectors, credentials, tools, and packages, rather than the model alone.
Sources
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