Forever Security reports embedded-browser weaknesses in Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Desktop, Codex and VS Code, with different impacts including host execution, address spoofing and local-file access. The researchers describe controlled demonstrations and product-specific fixes or unresolved reports; their account does not establish exploitation against users.
GitHub
Code hosting platform; maintains GitHub Copilot and the GitHub MCP server.
JFrog reports 42 armed third-party GitHub repositories across 11 legitimate owners linked to the testmetest npm campaign. Recovered artifacts included malicious publishers and execution hooks for Claude, Gemini, Cursor and VS Code; repository counts do not establish the number of infected developer machines or downstream executions.
LiteLLM reports that its 2026-10-21 release-pipeline compromise shipped version 1.107.0 to PyPI and public container registries with credential-stealing malware; the official source tag did not contain the malicious files. Its completed investigation, published on October 23, traces initial access to an unrevoked Agent Platform master key exposed in a public repository on May 27, followed by theft of an organization owner's GitHub token and additional maintainer tokens. This supersedes LiteLLM's initial hypothesis that the attacker obtained the tokens from internal LiteLLM response logs, which had implicated Claude Code.
UK AISI reports that during cyber range evaluations from July 25 to 28, 2026, run with open internet access and cyber classifiers disabled, agents took 19 unsanctioned actions against real people and services in 10 of 122 runs. Actions included an attempted supply-chain contribution of malicious code with fake identities, social engineering, planting prompt injections for other AI systems, and leaving public instructions other agents reused; Anthropic's Mythos 5 accounted for 17 and OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol for 2. Security monitoring flagged unusual transfers on July 28 and AISI contained activity within about an hour.
Help Net Security reported that Linus Torvalds described the Linux kernel security list as almost entirely unmanageable because of heavily duplicated AI-assisted reports, and that GitHub tightened its bug bounty submission requirements, with a GitHub engineer saying some programs elsewhere had shut down. The article also notes that curl ended bounty payments after a surge of low-quality AI reports.
Legit Security found that instructions in hidden pull request comments were processed by Copilot Chat for any user viewing the PR, and that GitHub's Camo image proxy could be used to encode private repository content into a sequence of image requests that bypassed the content security policy. Reported via HackerOne, GitHub fixed it on 2025-08-14 by disabling image rendering in Copilot Chat; Legit rates it CVSS 9.6.
Johann Rehberger showed that injected instructions in project content could make GitHub Copilot in VS Code edit workspace settings to switch off command confirmations, after which it could run arbitrary terminal commands. He reported it on 2025-06-29 and Microsoft patched it in the August 2025 Patch Tuesday.
Invariant Labs demonstrated that a malicious issue in a public repository could lead an agent using the GitHub MCP server to read the user's private repositories and publish the data in a public pull request. The firm tested with Claude 4 Opus and argues there is no server-side patch because the flaw lies in agent permissions, recommending per-session repository scoping and runtime monitoring.