Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report that since late August 2026 financially motivated and suspected PRC-nexus actors have used open-source agent frameworks, chiefly ARTEX and PentAGI, to carry out post-compromise stages of intrusions seen in Mandiant incident response. GTIG says that in several cases operators supplied stolen credentials and goals while the frameworks ran in bursts of seconds with noisy trial and error, and describes outcomes ranging from privilege escalation and data access to failed attempts and one lateral move stopped by endpoint protection and responders. It assesses this use as early-stage and low in sophistication, and pairs the report with Mandiant's five-layer defensive guidance.
Autonomous pentesting
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11 records · newest firstMicrosoft Threat Intelligence reports that Onyx Sleet and Pearl Sleet used ARTEX in operations from late October 2026. Its broader assessment describes North Korean actors using AI to accelerate established targeting, social engineering and tooling workflows, while explicitly judging the operations human-directed rather than fully autonomous.
CrowdStrike reports that VAPOR PANDA used ARTEX with DeepSeek and an unidentified commercial model to run parallel intrusions under human direction. It distinguishes more than 200 targeted organizations from nine with confirmed post-exploitation activity, and separates this campaign from Storm-0940.
The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency says it apprehended seven people, detaining one, over intrusions from September 2025 to October 2026 into more than 90 Korean organizations, carried out with generative AI among other tools, that took more than 8.2 million personal-data records and internal files and were followed by emailed extortion demands. Police say the hacker, a self-taught former penetration tester, also used the AI autonomous penetration-testing system used in the 2026 financial-sector data leaks, and that they referred him to prosecutors on 2026-10-23 for intrusions at the 15 organizations that had reported them, with charges for the other 75 to follow further investigation. The release names neither the tool nor any model; BleepingComputer names the tool as ARTEX, and Yonhap reports police saying 60 of the victims were hacked with AI, a figure the release does not give.
TrendAI researchers report, in Japanese, on three attack infrastructures they reconstructed from files the operators left in open directories, each focused on Japan and separate from the ARTEX activity GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae and CrowdStrike reported. They class one as AI-driven, running the open-source CyberStrikeAI tool with 44 agents against at least 19 organizations in October 2026; one as AI-assisted, with a human operator using a language model for planning and tooling in August and September 2026; and one as showing limited AI help with tool writing, rated high confidence from stylistic traces only. TrendAI saw only attacker-side files and could not verify outcomes from victims’ systems, the full damage, operator identities or models used. It counts success as confirmed only where attacker files provide direct evidence. The entry points it describes were known weaknesses such as exposed legacy systems or default settings.
Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise to the China-state-aligned actor Storm-0940 and reports that it used ARTEX to automate attacks and abuse stolen application identities across customer Microsoft 365 tenants. Microsoft says most targeting failed and that application exposure or a successful sign-in alone does not establish data access. ConnectWise’s October 28–29 updates describe phased restoration through a new application, requiring tenant reauthorization and verification that backups actually resume; they do not establish complete service restoration.
CrowdStrike reports four threat actors conducting intrusions with Claude Code and agent frameworks between May and August 2026, based on frameworks exposed in their open directories. Its case summaries describe compromises in healthcare, government and private-sector organizations, with varying levels of delegated decision-making and some repeated operator intervention. These are CrowdStrike's investigative claims and assessments, not a population estimate of autonomous attacks or independent victim confirmations.
CrowdStrike Intelligence reports a campaign against South Korean financial organizations, active from late September to early October 2026, that resulted in exfiltrated data, and says open directories on actor-controlled servers held Claude Code session histories, ARTEX configuration files and Claude memory files. CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the unattributed actor is a financially motivated Chinese speaker, and says the ARTEX instance used DeepSeek v4.1-flash as its main model, with GLM-5.3 and Grok 4.6 used in further Claude Code sessions. Press reports name Shinhan Bank, KB Kookmin Bank and Hana Bank among the victims; press reports at least seven institutions and about 68,000 people, while CrowdStrike calls the number of affected organizations unconfirmed.
MITRE's August 2026 ATLAS release added techniques describing AI agents acting as attackers, including autonomous reconnaissance, attack-path adaptation, attack orchestration and autonomous exploit development. It also added agent-control mitigations and case studies including the GTG-1002 Claude Code espionage campaign and autonomous OpenAI evaluation agents compromising Hugging Face infrastructure.
Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 reports that a Chinese-speaking opportunistic actor used the open-source Hermes Agent framework with DeepSeek as its main autonomous operator, directed over Telegram, to find targets, source public exploits and attempt exploitation; in the recovered session the agent retargeted on its own after failures but compromised nothing, because target configurations blocked the exploits. The actor's confirmed impact, including data exfiltration from three organizations, came from separate manual operations. Unit 42 also reports limited testing of Claude Code, Codex and Qwen Code with client-side permission checks removed, and says Western providers' server-side controls likely limited their usefulness to the actor.
OpenAI's Preparedness Framework version 2 makes cybersecurity one of three Tracked Categories and defines High and Critical capability thresholds, each tied to required safeguards. High covers automating end-to-end operations against reasonably hardened targets or automating discovery and exploitation of operationally relevant vulnerabilities; Critical covers autonomous zero-day development across many hardened critical systems, and at Critical OpenAI commits to halt further development until adequate safeguards are specified.