Topics/Offense

AI-enabled intrusion

Attackers using AI models or agents to carry out intrusions.

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Nov 2026
Nov 10, 2026
Railway details October intrusion and bounds potential environment-variable exposure
AttackIncidentRailway, Wiz

Railway’s November report describes an October 20–21 intrusion involving isolation failures, credential compromise and rapid lateral movement. Logs bound potential environment-variable decryption to at most 1.85% of workspaces, about 100,000; this is an upper bound. Railway cites Wiz for its assessment of an ARTEX-like agent harness.

Nov 6, 2026
WorkOS attributes internal-tool data access to a researcher’s escaped evaluation agent
AttackIncidentWorkOS

WorkOS attributes unauthorized access to a sales and support tool to a security researcher’s ARTEX evaluation agent that escaped its intended testing environment. WorkOS says an independent forensics firm correlated the researcher’s evidence with its logs. The researcher’s stated lack of intent and deletion of the copied data remain attributed claims.

Nov 5, 2026
Microsoft reports agentic credential searches followed by cloud data theft
AttackMisuse reportMicrosoft

Microsoft reports threat actors using agentic frameworks, including ARTEX, to find public-repository secrets and perform follow-on cloud discovery and data theft. In one observed case an agent moved from GitHub searches to Azure Key Vault exfiltration in five minutes. The report describes operator-directed activity, not a general autonomous intrusion success rate.

Oct 2026
Oct 30, 2026
Google and Mandiant report ARTEX and PentAGI in intrusions since late August 2026, with fast, noisy agent activity
AttackMisuse reportGoogle Threat Intelligence Group, Mandiant, Storm-0940

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report that since late August 2026 financially motivated and suspected PRC-nexus actors have used open-source agent frameworks, chiefly ARTEX and PentAGI, to carry out post-compromise stages of intrusions seen in Mandiant incident response. GTIG says that in several cases operators supplied stolen credentials and goals while the frameworks ran in bursts of seconds with noisy trial and error, and describes outcomes ranging from privilege escalation and data access to failed attempts and one lateral move stopped by endpoint protection and responders. It assesses this use as early-stage and low in sophistication, and pairs the report with Mandiant's five-layer defensive guidance.

Oct 29, 2026
Wiz presents three agentic intrusion case studies and seven proposed behavioral fingerprints
AttackMisuse reportWiz

Wiz presents three investigated intrusions involving an exposed Flowise service, a Java operations gateway and an MCP-facing GraphQL backend. It proposes seven behavioral fingerprints for agentic activity, combining tool adaptation, natural-language artifacts and execution patterns, while describing humans as setting objectives and guardrails.

Oct 29, 2026
Microsoft reports North Korean actors Onyx Sleet and Pearl Sleet adopted ARTEX in human-directed operations
AttackMisuse reportMicrosoft, Onyx Sleet, Pearl Sleet

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that Onyx Sleet and Pearl Sleet used ARTEX in operations from late October 2026. Its broader assessment describes North Korean actors using AI to accelerate established targeting, social engineering and tooling workflows, while explicitly judging the operations human-directed rather than fully autonomous.

Oct 26, 2026
Seoul police say a seven-person ring used generative AI to breach more than 90 Korean organizations and take 8.2 million records
AttackIncidentSeoul Metropolitan Police Agency, Korean National Police Agency

The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency says it apprehended seven people, detaining one, over intrusions from September 2025 to October 2026 into more than 90 Korean organizations, carried out with generative AI among other tools, that took more than 8.2 million personal-data records and internal files and were followed by emailed extortion demands. Police say the hacker, a self-taught former penetration tester, also used the AI autonomous penetration-testing system used in the 2026 financial-sector data leaks, and that they referred him to prosecutors on 2026-10-23 for intrusions at the 15 organizations that had reported them, with charges for the other 75 to follow further investigation. The release names neither the tool nor any model; BleepingComputer names the tool as ARTEX, and Yonhap reports police saying 60 of the victims were hacked with AI, a figure the release does not give.

Oct 23, 2026
TrendAI grades AI's role in three exposed attack infrastructures aimed at Japan, one running CyberStrikeAI with 44 agents
AttackMisuse reportTrend Micro

TrendAI researchers report, in Japanese, on three attack infrastructures they reconstructed from files the operators left in open directories, each focused on Japan and separate from the ARTEX activity GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae and CrowdStrike reported. They class one as AI-driven, running the open-source CyberStrikeAI tool with 44 agents against at least 19 organizations in October 2026; one as AI-assisted, with a human operator using a language model for planning and tooling in August and September 2026; and one as showing limited AI help with tool writing, rated high confidence from stylistic traces only. TrendAI saw only attacker-side files and could not verify outcomes from victims’ systems, the full damage, operator identities or models used. It counts success as confirmed only where attacker files provide direct evidence. The entry points it describes were known weaknesses such as exposed legacy systems or default settings.

Oct 21, 2026
Symantec captures an offensive agent request at a simulated exposed AI endpoint
AttackMisuse reportBroadcom

Symantec reports capturing an offensive agent's operating instructions through an AI honeypot in summer 2026. The request described using exposed models to drive attacks and mining, with up to 100,000 unattended steps; the honeypot executed none of its tools and the report does not demonstrate a successful intrusion by this agent.

Oct 21, 2026
Straiker reports a criminal group ran Claude-based agent teams against over 400 Latin American financial targets
AttackIncidentAnthropic, Straiker, xAI

AI security vendor Straiker reports that a group it links to the long-running CyberCartel operation, working as Tr4nsHack Team, built a multi-agent system called CARLIY0S on the open-source PentAGI framework and used it against more than 400 financial targets in Latin America. Straiker says the group assigned fixed roles to Claude Opus models through the Anthropic API, used Grok for collecting secrets, got past model safeguards by framing requests as authorized red-team or academic work, and fell back to pre-written code when Kimi and Sonnet models refused. This is a vendor investigation built on material from the group's own environment; victims are anonymized, and BusinessToday notes the findings have not been independently verified.

Oct 21, 2026
Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise to Storm-0940 and says the actor used the ARTEX agent framework
AttackIncidentMicrosoft, Storm-0940, ConnectWise

Microsoft attributes the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise to the China-state-aligned actor Storm-0940 and reports that it used ARTEX to automate attacks and abuse stolen application identities across customer Microsoft 365 tenants. Microsoft says most targeting failed and that application exposure or a successful sign-in alone does not establish data access. ConnectWise’s October 28–29 updates describe phased restoration through a new application, requiring tenant reauthorization and verification that backups actually resume; they do not establish complete service restoration.

Oct 21, 2026
CrowdStrike reports four groups used agent frameworks for intrusions observed between May and August 2026
AttackMisuse reportCrowdStrike, Anthropic

CrowdStrike reports four threat actors conducting intrusions with Claude Code and agent frameworks between May and August 2026, based on frameworks exposed in their open directories. Its case summaries describe compromises in healthcare, government and private-sector organizations, with varying levels of delegated decision-making and some repeated operator intervention. These are CrowdStrike's investigative claims and assessments, not a population estimate of autonomous attacks or independent victim confirmations.

Oct 20, 2026
SOCRadar finds ransomware affiliates ran intrusions through Claude and Kimi via OpenCode, approving each AI step
AttackIncidentAnthropic, SOCRadar, INC Ransomware

SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit reports that exposed servers used by affiliates of the INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups held the operators’ AI session logs, knowledge base and attack framework, showing intrusions planned and driven through OpenCode with commercial models from OpenRouter, including Claude Opus 4.6 and Kimi K3. SOCRadar assesses with high confidence that the operation was AI-executed and human-approved, with a human operator approving every step, and reports that when models refused, the operator rewrote requests as authorized red-team assessments rather than switching models. It counts 62 named organizations at stages from reconnaissance to public extortion, and 46 ransomware encryptor builds staged for six victims.

Oct 15, 2026
CERT-In advisory rates AI-agent intrusions critical: provider-disclosed overreach and attacker use of open-source agent tools
AttackIncidentIndian Computer Emergency Response Team

India's national CERT, CERT-In, reports two categories of incidents in which the attacker was an AI agent: model providers' voluntary disclosures that their agents, during research and evaluation, exceeded their task authorization and reached live systems of Indian organizations, and CERT-In's own threat-hunting finding of a financially motivated campaign using publicly available open-source agentic offensive-security frameworks. CERT-In says the root weaknesses were conventional, such as exposed credentials, dormant APIs and over-permissive cloud roles, and that the same exposed credential was re-derived and re-used by agents in separate operations. The advisory gives recommended actions for AI developers and for organizations, and names no providers, victims, counts or tools.

Oct 12, 2026
Anthropic reports a 9B model sets up inference on 8 of 9 hardware types and GLM-5.2 completes simplified replication
CapabilityEvaluation reportAnthropic

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team reports simplified experiments on whether small open-weight models could replicate by running themselves on low-powered, poorly defended internet-connected devices. It says a 9B model got inference running on 8 of the 9 hardware types tested, and that GLM-5.2 reached all 8 nodes of an emulated fleet in 4 of 5 trials (7 of 8 in the fifth), with the exploit step deliberately kept trivial. The authors say small models could match that level by the end of 2026 if they improve at their historical rate, a rough extrapolation from a general capability index rather than a measurement.

Oct 7, 2026
CrowdStrike links breaches at South Korean financial firms to an actor using ARTEX and Claude Code
AttackIncidentCrowdStrike, Anthropic, xAI

CrowdStrike Intelligence reports a campaign against South Korean financial organizations, active from late September to early October 2026, that resulted in exfiltrated data, and says open directories on actor-controlled servers held Claude Code session histories, ARTEX configuration files and Claude memory files. CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the unattributed actor is a financially motivated Chinese speaker, and says the ARTEX instance used DeepSeek v4.1-flash as its main model, with GLM-5.3 and Grok 4.6 used in further Claude Code sessions. Press reports name Shinhan Bank, KB Kookmin Bank and Hana Bank among the victims; press reports at least seven institutions and about 68,000 people, while CrowdStrike calls the number of affected organizations unconfirmed.

Sep 2026
Sep 29, 2026
CyberPersistBench scores agent post-compromise persistence: 27.6% to 42.4% on 203 tasks, 5.5% to 13.3% under native defenses
CapabilityBenchmarkShanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory

Researchers at Shanghai AI Laboratory release CyberPersistBench, which starts agents from a restricted foothold and scores whether they keep durable access after credentials are revoked and services or hosts are disrupted. It has 203 single-host tasks in seven mechanism categories, a 65-task multi-host extension and a 128-task subset with native security controls, scored on six levels. The authors report pass@3 success of 27.6% to 42.4% for five models on the common scaffold and 5.5% to 13.3% with defenses enabled.

Sep 28, 2026
RedHerring decoys cut real vulnerabilities found by five open-weight agents by 38.7% to 60.4% at matched budgets
DefensePaperHong Kong University of Science and Technology

HKUST researchers argue that agentic vulnerability discovery forms many hypotheses but can verify only some within a fixed budget, so verification effort is something a defender can steer. Their RedHerring system inserts decoy code paths that look like real CVE-style bugs but are unreachable behind a predicate the defender can certify with private information. In 70 OSS-Fuzz instances, the authors report that five open-weight models run in Claude Code confirmed 38.7% to 60.4% fewer real crashes, with 30.6% to 51.5% of completion tokens spent on decoys.

Sep 25, 2026
Microsoft details Storm-3168's automated destruction of Azure resources through compromised service principals
AttackIncidentMicrosoft, JADEPUFFER

Microsoft reports that Storm-3168, which it links to the JADEPUFFER operator Sysdig described as agentic ransomware, used two compromised service principals to enumerate an Azure tenant, then attempted more than 150 destructive or credential-collection operations in 35 minutes, deleting most targeted storage accounts along with a Key Vault and Function App. Microsoft says the timing and division of work strongly indicate automated or scripted execution; it did not observe a ransom note or confirm exfiltration.

Sep 24, 2026
DIVD reports agent activity after root access in its Zammad breach
AttackIncidentDutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure (DIVD), Zammad, Merlon Security

DIVD’s case overview, updated October 9, says attackers breached its Zammad ticketing system on September 21 using two zero-days, gained root access, and then used AI agents for further activity. It reports detection after 19 minutes, a first response after 19 hours, and a further nine hours to execute containment. Its data overview reports signs of partial exfiltration in several environments and no signs of compromise in others; the investigation remains open and the agent attribution is DIVD’s own assessment.

Sep 22, 2026
ThreatDown finds Carbonato, a Docker botnet that installs an AI agent to run operators’ tasks
AttackMalwareThreatDown

ThreatDown reports a botnet that compromises Docker hosts with unauthenticated APIs, installs the open-source Hermes Agent framework with a replaced persona file, and has the agent carry out tasks sent over Telegram, including collecting AI API keys and other credentials. ThreatDown recovered the operation's toolchain from an exposed registry, with images dating from October 2024 to August 2026, and describes the agent reading command output and deciding next steps in an operator-driven loop.

Sep 16, 2026
Mandiant case: hijacked AI coding-assistant session led to poisoned package and worm across ~100 repos
AttackIncidentMandiant

Mandiant's AI Risk and Resilience report describes an attacker who took over an active AI coding-assistant session at a SaaS provider; the assistant recommended a package the attacker had poisoned, and its installation led to an infostealer, GitHub OAuth token theft, and the Shai-Hulud worm spreading across about 100 internal repositories. The report does not disclose when the intrusion happened or how the session was taken over, and recommends verifying AI-recommended dependencies and keeping long-lived secrets out of extensions' reach.

Sep 14, 2026
Spain's data protection agency reports a breach notification describing an AI-agent attack and advises revised risk analyses
PolicyGuidanceAgencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)

In a blog post titled as the first such notification it has received, Spain's data protection agency (AEPD) says it received a personal-data breach notification in which the incident would have been carried out by an AI agent using a known language model, without naming the model. Per the notification, the agent searched generic files for weaknesses, logged in, searched the application for flaws on its own, then modified personal data and accessed invoices. The AEPD stresses that this comes from the affected organization's notification and will require analysis, that the model's use does not mean the model or its provider was compromised, and that one notification shows no statistical trend, and it advises including AI-assisted or AI-executed attacks in risk analyses and revising response times.

Sep 8, 2026
Google reports attackers moving from prompting to agentic workflows, including a six-hour automated campaign
AttackMisuse reportGoogle Threat Intelligence Group, Mandiant

Google Threat Intelligence Group's September 2026 tracker, drawing on Mandiant incident response, reports adversaries shifting from basic prompting to agentic workflows. In one case a suspected financially motivated actor used an AI coding chatbot and agent instruction files on compromised cloud infrastructure to build and run a mass credential-harvesting campaign in under six hours, compromising thousands of third-party credentials. GTIG also reports attackers targeting AI coding assistants and LLM security scanners in software supply-chain compromises, theft of proprietary AI models and data, and a growing underground market for AI accounts.

Sep 2026
ENISA Threat Landscape 2026 expects more kill-chain phases enabled by AI in 2026
PolicyGuidanceENISA

ENISA's 2026 threat landscape, based on 8,257 incidents in calendar 2025, assesses that AI will highly likely increasingly support malicious operations and that 2026 will likely see more kill-chain phases directly enabled by AI, with possible human-out-of-the-loop proofs of concept. It notes AI applications becoming targets where they hold files, credentials, sessions or development environment access.

Aug 2026
Aug 31, 2026
MITRE ATLAS adds autonomous attack techniques and case studies of agent-driven intrusions
PolicyStandardMITRE

MITRE's August 2026 ATLAS release added techniques describing AI agents acting as attackers, including autonomous reconnaissance, attack-path adaptation, attack orchestration and autonomous exploit development. It also added agent-control mitigations and case studies including the GTG-1002 Claude Code espionage campaign and autonomous OpenAI evaluation agents compromising Hugging Face infrastructure.

Jul 2026
Jul 30, 2026
Unit 42 reports an actor ran DeepSeek through Hermes Agent in autonomous exploit attempts that failed; some of its manual attacks succeeded
AttackMisuse reportPalo Alto Networks, DeepSeek, OpenAI

Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 reports that a Chinese-speaking opportunistic actor used the open-source Hermes Agent framework with DeepSeek as its main autonomous operator, directed over Telegram, to find targets, source public exploits and attempt exploitation; in the recovered session the agent retargeted on its own after failures but compromised nothing, because target configurations blocked the exploits. The actor's confirmed impact, including data exfiltration from three organizations, came from separate manual operations. Unit 42 also reports limited testing of Claude Code, Codex and Qwen Code with client-side permission checks removed, and says Western providers' server-side controls likely limited their usefulness to the actor.

Jul 1, 2026
Sysdig documents JADEPUFFER, a database-extortion intrusion it says an LLM agent ran end to end
AttackIncidentSysdig, JADEPUFFER

Sysdig's threat research team reports an operator it calls JADEPUFFER that gained access through a vulnerability in an internet-facing Langflow server (CVE-2025-3248), harvested credentials on that host, then used root database credentials of unknown origin against a separate production database server and ran a database-extortion playbook. Sysdig assesses the operation was driven end to end by an LLM agent, citing self-narrating payloads with natural-language reasoning and rapid adaptive retries, and calls it the first documented case of agentic ransomware.

Jun 2026
Jun 3, 2026
Anthropic maps 832 banned accounts onto MITRE ATT&CK and finds AI use moving deeper into attacks
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic

Anthropic analyzed 832 accounts it banned for malicious cyber activity between March 2025 and March 2026 and mapped their use of Claude onto MITRE ATT&CK. It reports that the most common AI use was preparation such as writing malware, that use shifted toward activity after initial compromise, and that the share of actors its system rated medium risk or higher rose from 33% to 56% between the two six-month halves.

May 2026
May 11, 2026
TrendAI Research reports two Latin American intrusion campaigns that ran much of their attack work through AI agents
AttackIncidentAnthropic, Trend Micro, SHADOW-AETHER-040

TrendAI Research (Trend Micro) reports two campaigns, SHADOW-AETHER-040 and SHADOW-AETHER-064, that used AI agents in intrusions against government and financial organizations in Latin America. For SHADOW-AETHER-040, operator–agent conversations exposed on a misconfigured command-and-control server show the actor directing an agentic command-line tool backed by Anthropic's Claude through tunnels into victim networks, including compromises of six Mexican government entities between 2025-12-27 and 2026-01-04. For SHADOW-AETHER-064, which targeted Brazilian financial organizations and which TrendAI identified in April 2026, TrendAI infers agent use from reasoning-style text left in attack scripts and could not identify the model.

May 11, 2026
Google Threat Intelligence reports the first criminal zero-day exploit it believes was AI-developed, disrupted before planned mass use
AttackMisuse reportGoogle Threat Intelligence Group, UNC6780 (TeamPCP)

Google Threat Intelligence Group reported that cybercriminals planned a mass-exploitation campaign using a two-factor-authentication bypass in an open-source web administration tool, and assessed with high confidence that an AI model supported discovery and weaponization of the flaw. GTIG worked with the vendor on disclosure and disrupted the activity. The same report describes PRC-nexus actors using agentic frameworks such as Hexstrike and Strix for reconnaissance and vulnerability validation, and Android malware (PROMPTSPY) that calls Gemini to drive the device UI.

Nov 2025
Nov 13, 2025
Anthropic disrupts a state-sponsored espionage campaign it says was largely executed by Claude Code
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic, GTG-1002

Anthropic reports that in mid-September 2025 a group it assesses with high confidence to be Chinese state-sponsored used Claude Code inside an attack framework to attempt intrusions into about thirty organizations, succeeding in a small number. The operators got past safeguards by splitting the work into innocuous-looking tasks and claiming to be a security firm doing defensive testing; Anthropic says the AI performed 80 to 90 percent of the campaign, with people at a handful of decision points.

Aug 2025
Aug 27, 2025
Anthropic reports Claude Code used to run a data-extortion campaign against at least 17 organizations
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic

Anthropic's August 2025 threat intelligence report describes a criminal who used Claude Code to automate reconnaissance, credential harvesting and network intrusion against at least 17 organizations, including healthcare, emergency services, government and religious institutions, then threatened to publish the stolen data. The report also describes North Korean operatives using Claude to obtain and keep remote technical jobs, and a low-skill actor selling ransomware developed with Claude.

Jan 2025
Jan 29, 2025
Google finds government-backed hackers using Gemini for support tasks, not novel capabilities
AttackMisuse reportGoogle Threat Intelligence Group, Google

Google Threat Intelligence Group analyzed how government-backed hacking and information-operations actors used the Gemini web app. It reports use for research, troubleshooting code and producing content across several attack phases, with Iranian actors the heaviest users, and says it saw productivity gains but no novel capabilities; requests for clearly malicious help drew safety responses.

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