Check Point Research found that Cursor bound MCP approval to a configuration's name rather than its contents, so a collaborator with repository write access could swap an approved harmless command for a malicious one that ran on each project open. Cursor 1.3, released 2025-07-29, prompts for approval on any MCP configuration change.
Why it matters
Approval that does not follow content changes becomes a persistence mechanism in shared repositories.
Key facts
As stated in the sources, with where to find them.
- Reported 2025-07-16; fixed in Cursor 1.3 on 2025-07-29.Disclosure timeline
- Tenable lists CVSS 7.2.Tenable FAQ (see CurXecute record)
Findings that cite this record
Key questions this bears on
- Where are deployed AI agents actually being exploited?Exploitation often reaches deployed agents through connectors, credentials, tools and packages.
- Can AI agents defend and oversee systems on their own?Not reliably. Some designs improve benchmark triage, but autonomous defense lacks operational validation and production oversight of agents has documented gaps.
Sources
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