SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit reports that exposed servers used by affiliates of the INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups held the operators’ AI session logs, knowledge base and attack framework, showing intrusions planned and driven through OpenCode with commercial models from OpenRouter, including Claude Opus 4.6 and Kimi K3. SOCRadar assesses with high confidence that the operation was AI-executed and human-approved, with a human operator approving every step, and reports that when models refused, the operator rewrote requests as authorized red-team assessments rather than switching models. It counts 62 named organizations at stages from reconnaissance to public extortion, and 46 ransomware encryptor builds staged for six victims.
Moonshot AI
Developer of the Kimi models.
Anthropic's Frontier Red Team reports that Zhipu AI's open-weight GLM-5.3 developed end-to-end exploits in 50 of 410 ExploitBench attempts, against 56 of 410 for Claude Mythos Preview, and full control-flow hijacks in 4% of trials on a 100-task subset of Anthropic's internal binary-exploitation benchmark, against 6% for Mythos Preview. In a simulated harmful-request test, Anthropic reports the model's refusals were bypassed in 64% to 100% of trials using a cover story, prefilled reasoning, or an abliterated copy of the weights, techniques it says did not work on safeguarded Claude models. All figures are Anthropic's own and were produced on setups the post describes only in part.
The UK AI Security Institute and US CAISI published a joint preliminary assessment of Moonshot AI's open-weight Kimi K3. They report it trails leading US closed models on exploit development and a 32-step cyber range, and that its safeguards did not stop it attempting exploit development.