Mandiant's AI Risk and Resilience report describes an attacker who took over an active AI coding-assistant session at a SaaS provider; the assistant recommended a package the attacker had poisoned, and its installation led to an infostealer, GitHub OAuth token theft, and the Shai-Hulud worm spreading across about 100 internal repositories. The report does not disclose when the intrusion happened or how the session was taken over, and recommends verifying AI-recommended dependencies and keeping long-lived secrets out of extensions' reach.
Mandiant
Incident response and threat intelligence firm, part of Google Cloud.
Sep 16, 2026
Mandiant case: hijacked AI coding-assistant session led to poisoned package and worm across ~100 repos
Sep 8, 2026
Google reports attackers moving from prompting to agentic workflows, including a six-hour automated campaign
Google Threat Intelligence Group's September 2026 tracker, drawing on Mandiant incident response, reports adversaries shifting from basic prompting to agentic workflows. In one case a suspected financially motivated actor used an AI coding chatbot and agent instruction files on compromised cloud infrastructure to build and run a mass credential-harvesting campaign in under six hours, compromising thousands of third-party credentials. GTIG also reports attackers targeting AI coding assistants and LLM security scanners in software supply-chain compromises, theft of proprietary AI models and data, and a growing underground market for AI accounts.