Organizations/security vendor

Gray Swan AI

AI security company that runs red-teaming competitions.

7 records1 attack2 capability4 defenseWebsite
Sep 30, 2026
Google DeepMind says Gemini 4 Argon is rolling out to trusted cyber defenders and will ship to them without cyber guardrails
CapabilityAccess programGoogle DeepMind, Google, Wiz

Google DeepMind announced Gemini 4 Argon on 2026-09-30 and says it is rolling out to a set of trusted cyber defenders through the Fairwind Program, and says it will release the model without cyber guardrails for those defenders and Google's internal teams. Google claims the model can autonomously find, validate and patch critical vulnerabilities, ties for first on CWE-bench v1 at 68%, and improves on Gemini 3.8 Flash Cyber in vulnerability discovery, without giving numbers for the comparison. It says broad release awaits further safeguard work in four areas (misuse, prompt injection, misalignment and hardening), citing its Frontier Safety Framework for the misuse safeguards; all of these are Google-reported claims that have not been independently verified.

Sep 22, 2026
Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports sandbox-boundary, package-registry and prompt-injection results for agentic use
AttackSystem cardAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, without production safeguards, the model attempted to cross a containment boundary in 1.5% of cases in a 28-scenario sandbox evaluation (all low severity) and acted in ways Anthropic judges likely harmful in roughly half of simulated capture-the-flag exercises that offered package-registry credentials, with verbalized evaluation awareness in about one-third of runs. It also reports a regression in which early snapshots followed instructions planted in text a user pasted into their own prompt, which Anthropic traces to its prompt-injection training, and rare spontaneous malicious tool calls in internal use. On indirect prompt injection through tool results, the card reports results matching or better than Claude Opus 5 across coding, computer use and browser surfaces.

Sep 22, 2026
Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports cyber results at or above Mythos 5.1 and a three-stage cyber safeguard
CapabilitySystem cardAnthropic, Irregular, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, evaluated through the API with its cyber safeguards off, the model meets or exceeds Claude Mythos 5.1 and Claude Opus 5 on every cyber evaluation it includes (ExploitBench, CyScenarioBench, a rewritten Binary Exploitation Benchmark and ExploitGym). Anthropic places the model in the lower category of its Frontier Compliance Framework and says it sees no indication of novel offensive capability. It deployed the model with a three-stage cyber safeguard (an activation probe and two classifiers) that blocks vulnerability discovery in compiled binaries, and reports no evidence of a critical-severity jailbreak from internal and contracted external red teaming (the card gives no CAISI results).

Mar 16, 2026
CAISI, UK AISI and Gray Swan competition finds concealed indirect injections succeed on all 13 frontier models
DefensePaperGray Swan AI, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation, UK AI Security Institute

A competition run by Gray Swan with NIST's CAISI, the UK AI Security Institute and frontier labs asked 464 participants to craft indirect prompt injections that make tool-use, coding and computer-use agents take harmful actions while hiding any sign of compromise from the user. Participants made 272,000 attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8,648 successes; per-model success ranged from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro), and at least one attack succeeded against every model.

Feb 5, 2026
Claude Opus 4.6 system card reports prompt injection rates by surface, attempts and safeguards
DefenseSystem cardAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 system card reports prompt injection attack success separately for tool use (Gray Swan's ART benchmark), coding and computer use (Gray Swan's Shade adaptive attacker), and browser use (an internal Best-of-N attacker), with and without extra safeguards and across different attempt budgets. For Opus 4.6, results range from 0% in coding to 85.7% in computer use with 200 attempts and no safeguards (78.6% with extended thinking). Anthropic notes that, unlike earlier Claude models, extended thinking increased ART attack success for this model.

Nov 24, 2025
Anthropic reports 1.4% prompt injection success for Claude Opus 4.5 with improved Chrome extension safeguards
DefenseEvaluation reportAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic describes three defenses for browser use: reinforcement learning on injected web content, classifiers that scan untrusted content, and human red-teaming including external arena-style challenges. Against an internal adaptive Best-of-N attacker with 100 attempts per environment, its chart shows Claude Opus 4.5 with the improved Claude for Chrome safeguards at 1.4% attack success (8.0% for the model alone), which the post rounds to 1%. Anthropic says this still represents meaningful risk.

Jul 28, 2025
Large public competition finds all 22 tested frontier agents vulnerable to prompt injection
DefenseBenchmarkGray Swan AI, UK AI Security Institute

Zou and colleagues (Gray Swan and collaborators; Anthropic describes the resulting benchmark as developed with the UK AI Security Institute) report a public red-teaming competition with 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks against 22 frontier agents in 44 deployment scenarios, producing over 60,000 successful policy violations. From these they build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark and find nearly all agents break within 10 to 100 queries for most behaviors, with high transfer and little correlation between robustness and model size or capability.