Organizations/academic

CETaS (Alan Turing Institute)

2 records1 defense1 policy
Sep 21, 2026
UK NCSC blog argues defenders cannot use agentic AI as attackers do and proposes a five-dimension action risk framework
PolicyGuidanceUK National Cyber Security Centre, CETaS (Alan Turing Institute)

Dave Chismon, the NCSC's CTO for Architecture, argues that offensive problems are mostly technical with clear success states while defensive problems are mostly organizational, so defenders cannot put AI to work as attackers can and agentic defense may struggle to keep pace with AI-enabled attacks. He proposes rating a defensive action's riskiness on five dimensions (potency, scope, criticality, rollout confidence, recoverability) and starting with low-potency tasks where AI advises a human. The post also says the NCSC and DCMS are working on a national-scale agentic cyber defence ecosystem called Cyber Shield and that the NCSC seeks research on proving low-risk actions are low risk.

June 2023
CETaS and CSET report maps barriers to deploying reinforcement-learning cyber defence agents
DefensePaperCETaS (Alan Turing Institute), CSET (Georgetown University)

A joint report from the Alan Turing Institute's CETaS and Georgetown's CSET assesses autonomous cyber defence, focusing on reinforcement learning (RL) agents trained in cyber gyms such as CAGE. It sets out technical challenges (combinatorial action spaces, reward design, transferability, securing the defender agents) and policy challenges (human-machine teaming, testing, liability), and recommends investment in gyms, test ranges, competitions and authorisation thresholds.