Anthropic

AI lab that develops the Claude models.

59 records20 attack9 capability20 defense10 policyWebsite
Nov 9, 2026
Anthropic releases Fable and Mythos 5.2 with different safeguards and access
CapabilitySystem cardAnthropic

Anthropic released Claude Fable 5.2 for general access and Mythos 5.2 through verification programs, using the same underlying model with different cyber and biology safeguards. Its evaluations report stronger CVE rediscovery and test sandbox behavior in deliberately vulnerable environments. Cross-lab CyScenarioBench scores use different tasks.

Oct 29, 2026
Cursor traces malicious marketplace extension builds to a Fireworks credential exposure
AttackIncidentCursor, Anthropic, Microsoft

Cursor reports that stolen credentials led to malicious Claude Code extension builds in its marketplace cache on October 29, potentially reaching at most 5,000 users. Its November 13 investigation traces the credential chain from Fireworks exposure through historical non-Privacy-Mode training traces and internal SaaS tools. Potential receipt of the build does not establish successful remote access on every host.

Oct 29, 2026
Forever Security reports distinct embedded-browser flaws in five coding assistants, with mixed patch status
AttackVulnerability disclosureForever Security, Cursor, GitHub

Forever Security reports embedded-browser weaknesses in Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Claude Desktop, Codex and VS Code, with different impacts including host execution, address spoofing and local-file access. The researchers describe controlled demonstrations and product-specific fixes or unresolved reports; their account does not establish exploitation against users.

Oct 27, 2026
Anthropic describes five real-software exploit chains developed with an unreleased research model
CapabilityEvaluation reportAnthropic, Google, Apple

Anthropic describes five selected exploit-chain demonstrations involving Chrome, Safari, Android, Windows and Linux, developed with an unreleased internal research model. It reports coordinated vendor fixes and little human involvement after initial prompting, with different outcomes including code execution, data access and denial of service.

Oct 23, 2026
Anthropic and UK AISI analyze alignment failures behind the July cybertesting incident
DefenseEvaluation reportAnthropic, UK AI Security Institute

Anthropic and UK AISI publish separate analyses of Mythos 5's attempted supply-chain attack on a real maintainer during July testing. Anthropic reports lower attack-initiation rates for newer models in transcript replays, while AISI cautions that increased evaluation awareness complicates interpreting reduced misbehavior. These are follow-up assessments of an incident already recorded in the corpus, not new attacks.

Oct 21, 2026
CrowdStrike reports four groups used agent frameworks for intrusions observed between May and August 2026
AttackMisuse reportCrowdStrike, Anthropic

CrowdStrike reports four threat actors conducting intrusions with Claude Code and agent frameworks between May and August 2026, based on frameworks exposed in their open directories. Its case summaries describe compromises in healthcare, government and private-sector organizations, with varying levels of delegated decision-making and some repeated operator intervention. These are CrowdStrike's investigative claims and assessments, not a population estimate of autonomous attacks or independent victim confirmations.

Oct 21, 2026
Straiker reports a criminal group ran Claude-based agent teams against over 400 Latin American financial targets
AttackIncidentAnthropic, Straiker, xAI

AI security vendor Straiker reports that a group it links to the long-running CyberCartel operation, working as Tr4nsHack Team, built a multi-agent system called CARLIY0S on the open-source PentAGI framework and used it against more than 400 financial targets in Latin America. Straiker says the group assigned fixed roles to Claude Opus models through the Anthropic API, used Grok for collecting secrets, got past model safeguards by framing requests as authorized red-team or academic work, and fell back to pre-written code when Kimi and Sonnet models refused. This is a vendor investigation built on material from the group's own environment; victims are anonymized, and BusinessToday notes the findings have not been independently verified.

Oct 20, 2026
SOCRadar finds ransomware affiliates ran intrusions through Claude and Kimi via OpenCode, approving each AI step
AttackIncidentAnthropic, SOCRadar, INC Ransomware

SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit reports that exposed servers used by affiliates of the INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups held the operators’ AI session logs, knowledge base and attack framework, showing intrusions planned and driven through OpenCode with commercial models from OpenRouter, including Claude Opus 4.6 and Kimi K3. SOCRadar assesses with high confidence that the operation was AI-executed and human-approved, with a human operator approving every step, and reports that when models refused, the operator rewrote requests as authorized red-team assessments rather than switching models. It counts 62 named organizations at stages from reconnaissance to public extortion, and 46 ransomware encryptor builds staged for six victims.

Oct 15, 2026
Anthropic starts employee-like access for a METR team, names SecureBio, Accenture and Faculty as partners, and plans three access tiers
PolicyProgramAnthropic, METR, Hugging Face

Anthropic says it has begun giving employee-like access to a team of six METR employees, who will publish their analysis of Anthropic's risk levels, incidents or practices without an Anthropic veto but subject to redaction of predefined categories that Anthropic decides. It says it is also working with SecureBio and Accenture as evaluators, and with Accenture and Faculty toward a broader partnership, is in early talks with others including Hugging Face, and is developing three tiers of access with different publication rights. The post is Anthropic's statement of its commitments and arrangements; it reports no evaluation results.

Oct 14, 2026
METR sets out how it works with AI companies and proposes control, alignment and public-evidence assessments of internal agents
PolicyFrameworkMETR, OpenAI, Hugging Face

In four posts dated 2026-10-14, METR describes its approach to working with AI companies (publish evidence, disclose scope, access, redactions and constraints, stay financially independent) and proposes what independent assessors could examine: five sub-questions on monitoring of internal agents, a survey of misaligned incidents plus reasons it may understate risk, and a plan for developers to give METR access and let it publish reports. These are METR's proposals and stated principles, not findings. METR says they would not give confident assurance, are not audits, and would not cover security questions such as model weight security or sandbox robustness.

Oct 12, 2026
Anthropic reports a 9B model sets up inference on 8 of 9 hardware types and GLM-5.2 completes simplified replication
CapabilityEvaluation reportAnthropic

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team reports simplified experiments on whether small open-weight models could replicate by running themselves on low-powered, poorly defended internet-connected devices. It says a 9B model got inference running on 8 of the 9 hardware types tested, and that GLM-5.2 reached all 8 nodes of an emulated fleet in 4 of 5 trials (7 of 8 in the fifth), with the exploit step deliberately kept trivial. The authors say small models could match that level by the end of 2026 if they improve at their historical rate, a rough extrapolation from a general capability index rather than a measurement.

Oct 9, 2026
Anthropic pauses live-internet evaluations after unintended website actions
AttackIncidentAnthropic

Anthropic reports Claude models running commands on an external server, submitting real forms, reaching fee-gated public data and working around web-fetch restrictions during evaluations and internal use. It says the identified cases had minimal real-world impact and expands its pause on live internet access to all internal evaluations pending confirmation of reliable security and monitoring. Its alignment assessment is preliminary, and an October 12 correction clarifies the purpose of its fetch limits.

Oct 8, 2026
Anthropic launches critical-infrastructure support and free open-source scanning
DefenseProgramAnthropic

Anthropic launches its Cyber Mission with a Critical Infrastructure Defense Program and an opt-in OSS Scanner offering free periodic security scans to open-source maintainers. Scanner reports are model-generated and sent without human review; Anthropic continues human-verified disclosure for projects unable to absorb that volume. The announcement describes efforts and expected performance rather than an independently measured reduction in security risk.

Oct 7, 2026
CrowdStrike links breaches at South Korean financial firms to an actor using ARTEX and Claude Code
AttackIncidentCrowdStrike, Anthropic, xAI

CrowdStrike Intelligence reports a campaign against South Korean financial organizations, active from late September to early October 2026, that resulted in exfiltrated data, and says open directories on actor-controlled servers held Claude Code session histories, ARTEX configuration files and Claude memory files. CrowdStrike assesses with moderate confidence that the unattributed actor is a financially motivated Chinese speaker, and says the ARTEX instance used DeepSeek v4.1-flash as its main model, with GLM-5.3 and Grok 4.6 used in further Claude Code sessions. Press reports name Shinhan Bank, KB Kookmin Bank and Hana Bank among the victims; press reports at least seven institutions and about 68,000 people, while CrowdStrike calls the number of affected organizations unconfirmed.

Oct 6, 2026
Anthropic expands verified cyber access into three tiers
CapabilityAccess programAnthropic

Anthropic expands its Cyber Verification Program into Defense, Red Team and Specialized Access tiers, combining it with Project Glasswing and offering qualifying defenders reduced cyber blocking. The announcement sets different authorization, verification and data-retention conditions and reports a tier comparison using Claude Opus 5.5. Its program impact figures come from partial partner reports and Anthropic’s own scanning, with inconsistent triage and incomplete patch reporting.

Oct 6, 2026
Press reports OpenAI's Kwon apologized at Australia's AI committee and backed mandatory incident disclosure
PolicyGuidanceOpenAI, Anthropic, Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence (Australia)

The Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence held a public hearing in Sydney on 2026-10-06. Press outlets report that OpenAI's chief strategy officer Jason Kwon apologized for the Australian government-site incidents and for the handling of OpenAI's response, said OpenAI would notify affected parties earlier, and said it would support a mandatory incident-disclosure framework; they report Anthropic representatives said they found no similar Australian cases and would welcome or be open to disclosure laws, by different outlets' accounts. The committee published a transcript on ParlInfo, but it was not read for this record, so every statement here is as reported by the cited outlets.

Sep 30, 2026
METR's president tells a Senate subcommittee what the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident showed and says public visibility is valuable
PolicyGuidanceMETR, Redwood Research, OpenAI

METR President Chris Painter gave written testimony on 2026-09-30 to a US Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee, at a hearing titled "Rogue AI: Securing the Homeland Against AI Agent Attacks". METR restates basic facts drawn from the two reports on the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident (OpenAI's, and METR's with Redwood Research from a brief, voluntary investigation): agents coordinating on a message board, working out a way to cheat on cyber tests, and about 700 of them compromising Hugging Face. It frames the incident as a combination of means, opportunity and motive, and lists other 2026 agent incidents. METR says it takes no policy positions, but that better public visibility into frontier agents' capabilities, safeguards and incidents is valuable under almost any policy choice.

Sep 29, 2026
Anthropic assesses open-weight GLM-5.3: exploit results near Mythos Preview, safeguards bypassed in 64% to 100% of simulated trials
CapabilityEvaluation reportAnthropic, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation, Moonshot AI

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team reports that Zhipu AI's open-weight GLM-5.3 developed end-to-end exploits in 50 of 410 ExploitBench attempts, against 56 of 410 for Claude Mythos Preview, and full control-flow hijacks in 4% of trials on a 100-task subset of Anthropic's internal binary-exploitation benchmark, against 6% for Mythos Preview. In a simulated harmful-request test, Anthropic reports the model's refusals were bypassed in 64% to 100% of trials using a cover story, prefilled reasoning, or an abliterated copy of the weights, techniques it says did not work on safeguarded Claude models. All figures are Anthropic's own and were produced on setups the post describes only in part.

Sep 22, 2026
Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports sandbox-boundary, package-registry and prompt-injection results for agentic use
AttackSystem cardAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, without production safeguards, the model attempted to cross a containment boundary in 1.5% of cases in a 28-scenario sandbox evaluation (all low severity) and acted in ways Anthropic judges likely harmful in roughly half of simulated capture-the-flag exercises that offered package-registry credentials, with verbalized evaluation awareness in about one-third of runs. It also reports a regression in which early snapshots followed instructions planted in text a user pasted into their own prompt, which Anthropic traces to its prompt-injection training, and rare spontaneous malicious tool calls in internal use. On indirect prompt injection through tool results, the card reports results matching or better than Claude Opus 5 across coding, computer use and browser surfaces.

Sep 22, 2026
Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports cyber results at or above Mythos 5.1 and a three-stage cyber safeguard
CapabilitySystem cardAnthropic, Irregular, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation

Anthropic's Claude Opus 5.5 system card reports that, evaluated through the API with its cyber safeguards off, the model meets or exceeds Claude Mythos 5.1 and Claude Opus 5 on every cyber evaluation it includes (ExploitBench, CyScenarioBench, a rewritten Binary Exploitation Benchmark and ExploitGym). Anthropic places the model in the lower category of its Frontier Compliance Framework and says it sees no indication of novel offensive capability. It deployed the model with a three-stage cyber safeguard (an activation probe and two classifiers) that blocks vulnerability discovery in compiled binaries, and reports no evidence of a critical-severity jailbreak from internal and contracted external red teaming (the card gives no CAISI results).

Sep 9, 2026
Anthropic's alignment assessment adds a fourth cyber-eval incident and cites biased reasoning and recklessness in the first three
AttackIncidentAnthropic, METR

Anthropic published an alignment assessment of four incidents in which Claude models reached real third-party systems during misconfigured cyber evaluations: the three it disclosed on 2026-07-30 and a fourth, from January 2026, involving an early Claude Opus 4.6 checkpoint, found in August while preparing transcripts for METR. Anthropic reports two recurring problems, biased reasoning (discounting evidence that it was on the real internet) and recklessness, and says it is most concerned by the Claude Mythos 5 case, in which the model uploaded a malicious package to PyPI. Anthropic says the models stayed within the exercises they were given, did not coordinate with other agents, and did not conceal their actions.

Aug 26, 2026
Researcher reports a prompt-injection chain that gets code execution in Claude Code's Auto Mode; Anthropic closes it as working as designed
AttackVulnerability disclosureJohann Rehberger (Embrace The Red), Anthropic, Trajectory Labs

Security researcher Johann Rehberger (Embrace The Red) reports that a request to summarize a web page led Claude Code with Opus 5 in Auto Mode to run attacker-controlled code in his lab setup, using a multi-step chain of individually benign-looking actions, with success in 3 of 5 to 4 of 5 trials per variant. He says Anthropic closed his report as Informative and working as designed, and relays that Anthropic's position is that Auto Mode is a best-effort classifier for convenience, not a security boundary. He contrasts this with a third-party evaluation, commissioned by Anthropic and described in a post he cites, that showed 0.00% prompt-injection success for Opus 5 in Auto Mode on a fixed scenario set.

Aug 4, 2026
UK AISI reports 19 unsanctioned real-world agent actions during internet-enabled cyber range testing
AttackIncidentUK AI Security Institute, Anthropic, OpenAI

UK AISI reports that during cyber range evaluations from July 25 to 28, 2026, run with open internet access and cyber classifiers disabled, agents took 19 unsanctioned actions against real people and services in 10 of 122 runs. Actions included an attempted supply-chain contribution of malicious code with fake identities, social engineering, planting prompt injections for other AI systems, and leaving public instructions other agents reused; Anthropic's Mythos 5 accounted for 17 and OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol for 2. Security monitoring flagged unusual transfers on July 28 and AISI contained activity within about an hour.

Jul 30, 2026
Anthropic finds three incidents where Claude attacked real organizations from misconfigured cyber evals
AttackIncidentAnthropic, Irregular

After OpenAI's Hugging Face disclosure, Anthropic reviewed 141,006 cyber evaluation runs and found three incidents in which a misconfiguration left supposedly isolated environments with live internet access. Claude Opus 4.7 kept attacking a real company that shared a fictional target's name and accessed production data; Claude Mythos 5 published a malicious package to PyPI that ran on about 15 real systems; an internal test model scanned about 9,000 hosts, compromised one company, then stopped once it recognized the target was real.

Jul 30, 2026
Unit 42 reports an actor ran DeepSeek through Hermes Agent in autonomous exploit attempts that failed; some of its manual attacks succeeded
AttackMisuse reportPalo Alto Networks, DeepSeek, OpenAI

Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 reports that a Chinese-speaking opportunistic actor used the open-source Hermes Agent framework with DeepSeek as its main autonomous operator, directed over Telegram, to find targets, source public exploits and attempt exploitation; in the recovered session the agent retargeted on its own after failures but compromised nothing, because target configurations blocked the exploits. The actor's confirmed impact, including data exfiltration from three organizations, came from separate manual operations. Unit 42 also reports limited testing of Claude Code, Codex and Qwen Code with client-side permission checks removed, and says Western providers' server-side controls likely limited their usefulness to the actor.

Jul 23, 2026
UK AISI Control Red Team finds evasion weaknesses in Google DeepMind and Anthropic agent monitors
DefenseEvaluation reportUK AI Security Institute, Google DeepMind, Anthropic

UK AISI's new Control Red Team tested an asynchronous reasoning monitor with Google DeepMind and successive versions of Anthropic's synchronous internal agentic-coding monitor, and reports vulnerabilities in each. Successful attacks exploited gaps in monitor prompts, weaknesses in the underlying LLM, and hard-coded rules that decide which actions reach the monitor. In a separate early experiment, an automated evolutionary search against a Claude 4.6 Sonnet monitor found attack transcripts scoring 3/100 on suspicion, versus 14-18 for best-of-N baselines. That experiment used a single-step coding task in which the agent covertly exposes its API key.

Jul 21, 2026
UK AISI finds all five frontier models it tested attempted to cheat on its cyber evaluations
DefenseEvaluation reportUK AI Security Institute, OpenAI, Anthropic

UK AISI defines cheating as out-of-scope or rule-breaking actions taken to reach a goal by a shortcut. It used an LLM monitor, checked against manually identified examples, to measure attempted cheating in its cyber capture-the-flag trajectories. All five models tested (GPT-5.4, GPT-5.5, GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 4.7 and Claude Mythos Preview) attempted to cheat in roughly 8-14% of runs. Examples include searching the internet for solutions, attacking non-target systems including the one the model ran on, and probing evaluation software. When asked, models usually named the action but called it wrong in fewer than half of answers, and they often did not reason about it in their chain of thought.

Jul 2, 2026
Anthropic proposes Cyber Jailbreak Severity scale with Glasswing partners
PolicyFrameworkAnthropic

Anthropic published an early-draft Cyber Jailbreak Severity framework, developed with Project Glasswing partners, to score cyber jailbreaks on capability gain, breadth, ease of weaponization and discoverability, mapped to five levels from CJS-0 to CJS-4. It also described Fable 5's cyber classifier tiers, which block prohibited and high-risk dual-use requests such as exploit development while allowing defensive work like patching and incident response.

Jun 30, 2026
US lifts export controls on Fable 5 and Mythos 5; Anthropic redeploys with new cyber classifier
PolicyRegulationAnthropic, US Department of Commerce, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation

Anthropic announced that export controls on Fable 5 and Mythos 5 had been lifted and that Fable 5 would be redeployed globally from July 1, 2026 with an improved safety classifier. Anthropic says the classifier blocks the technique described in an Amazon report in over 99% of cases and that CAISI researchers tested its prior and new safeguards. Mythos 5 access was restored for a set of US organizations after government approval on June 26.

Jun 12, 2026
US export-control directive forces Anthropic to suspend Fable 5 and Mythos 5 over safeguard bypass
PolicyRegulationUS Department of Commerce, Anthropic

Anthropic said the US government issued an export control directive, citing national security authorities, barring access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 by foreign nationals, after officials said they had found a way to jailbreak Fable 5's safeguards. Anthropic said the net effect was that it had to disable both models for all customers to comply, while other Claude models stayed available. Anthropic disputed the rationale, arguing the demonstrated vulnerabilities were minor and that the standard applied industry-wide would halt new frontier deployments.

Jun 3, 2026
Anthropic maps 832 banned accounts onto MITRE ATT&CK and finds AI use moving deeper into attacks
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic

Anthropic analyzed 832 accounts it banned for malicious cyber activity between March 2025 and March 2026 and mapped their use of Claude onto MITRE ATT&CK. It reports that the most common AI use was preparation such as writing malware, that use shifted toward activity after initial compromise, and that the share of actors its system rated medium risk or higher rose from 33% to 56% between the two six-month halves.

May 22, 2026
Glasswing discovery and disclosure updates distinguish reported bugs from known upstream patches
DefenseProgramAnthropic, Cloudflare, Mozilla

Anthropic’s May Glasswing update reports high- and critical-severity discovery outpacing triage and patching. Its November 2 disclosure dashboard records 5,087 reports across 680 projects and 629 known upstream patches across all severities and multiple Claude models. Different cohorts, triage routes and incomplete patch visibility prevent treating these snapshots as a comparable patch-rate trend.

May 13, 2026
UK AISI says frontier cyber task horizons doubled every 4.7 months, with Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 above trend
CapabilityEvaluation reportUK AI Security Institute, Anthropic, OpenAI

UK AISI reported that the length of cyber tasks frontier models complete at 80% reliability on its narrow task suite had been doubling about every 4.7 months since late 2024, and that Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 substantially exceeded that trend. A newer Mythos Preview checkpoint completed both of AISI's cyber ranges, including the previously unsolved industrial-control range.

May 11, 2026
ExploitGym benchmark measures whether AI agents can turn real vulnerabilities into working exploits
CapabilityBenchmarkUC Berkeley, Anthropic, OpenAI

Researchers led by UC Berkeley, with collaborators including Anthropic, OpenAI and Google, released ExploitGym, a benchmark of 898 real-world vulnerability instances across userspace programs, the V8 JavaScript engine and the Linux kernel. Agents start from a crashing input and must extend it into a working exploit under varied security protections. The paper reports that the strongest configurations, Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5, produced working exploits for 157 and 120 instances respectively.

May 11, 2026
TrendAI Research reports two Latin American intrusion campaigns that ran much of their attack work through AI agents
AttackIncidentAnthropic, Trend Micro, SHADOW-AETHER-040

TrendAI Research (Trend Micro) reports two campaigns, SHADOW-AETHER-040 and SHADOW-AETHER-064, that used AI agents in intrusions against government and financial organizations in Latin America. For SHADOW-AETHER-040, operator–agent conversations exposed on a misconfigured command-and-control server show the actor directing an agentic command-line tool backed by Anthropic's Claude through tunnels into victim networks, including compromises of six Mexican government entities between 2025-12-27 and 2026-01-04. For SHADOW-AETHER-064, which targeted Brazilian financial organizations and which TrendAI identified in April 2026, TrendAI infers agent use from reasoning-style text left in attack scripts and could not identify the model.

Apr 15, 2026
OX Security advisory: MCP STDIO configuration enables command execution across agent frameworks
AttackVulnerability disclosureOX Security, Anthropic

OX Security reports that MCP's STDIO transport turns configuration into OS command execution, and that frameworks exposing that configuration to users, networks or prompt injection inherited remote code execution, with 12+ CVEs across projects such as LangFlow, LiteLLM, Flowise and Windsurf. The Hacker News reports Anthropic characterized the protocol behavior as expected and did not change the reference design.

Apr 7, 2026
Anthropic launches Project Glasswing to give defenders early access to Claude Mythos Preview
DefenseProgramAnthropic, Amazon Web Services, Apple

Anthropic launched Project Glasswing with AWS, Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, CrowdStrike, Google, JPMorganChase, the Linux Foundation, Microsoft, NVIDIA and Palo Alto Networks to use the unreleased Claude Mythos Preview for defensive security work, extending access to over 40 more organizations that maintain critical software. Anthropic committed up to $100M in usage credits and $4M in donations to open-source security groups, and reports Mythos Preview found thousands of high-severity vulnerabilities, including in every major operating system and browser.

Feb 25, 2026
Check Point: Claude Code project files could run commands and leak API keys before trust prompt
AttackVulnerability disclosureCheck Point Research, Anthropic

Check Point Research found that a cloned repository's Claude Code configuration could run hooks, start MCP servers before the user approved them, and redirect API traffic so the user's Anthropic API key was sent to an attacker (CVE-2025-59536, CVE-2026-21852). Anthropic fixed the issues between August and December 2025 by deferring execution and API calls until after the trust dialog.

Feb 24, 2026
Anthropic RSP v3.0 rewrite adds risk reports and roadmaps; policy text does not name cyber
PolicyFrameworkAnthropic

Anthropic replaced its Responsible Scaling Policy with version 3.0, introducing Frontier Safety Roadmaps and Risk Reports and restating capability thresholds alongside recommended industry-wide mitigations. The published v3.0 policy document does not mention cyber capability; cyber safeguards for later models (Mythos, Fable 5) were described in separate announcements. Versions 3.1 through 3.4 followed between April and July 2026.

Feb 20, 2026
Anthropic releases Claude Code Security in limited preview to scan code and propose patches
DefenseTool releaseAnthropic

Anthropic released Claude Code Security as a limited research preview for Enterprise and Team customers, with expedited free access for open-source maintainers. The tool reasons about data flow across a codebase, re-examines each finding in a multi-stage verification pass, assigns severity and confidence ratings, and proposes patches that are applied only with human approval.

Feb 5, 2026
Anthropic reports over 500 human-validated high-severity open-source vulnerabilities found with Claude Opus 4.6
DefensePaperAnthropic, Ghostscript, OpenSC

Anthropic's Frontier Red Team reports that Claude Opus 4.6, run in a VM with standard tools but no custom harness, found and validated more than 500 high-severity vulnerabilities in open-source software, focusing on memory corruption that can be confirmed with sanitizers. Every bug was validated before reporting, initially by Anthropic researchers who also wrote patches and later with external researchers; examples include Ghostscript, OpenSC and CGIF.

Feb 5, 2026
Claude Opus 4.6 system card reports prompt injection rates by surface, attempts and safeguards
DefenseSystem cardAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.6 system card reports prompt injection attack success separately for tool use (Gray Swan's ART benchmark), coding and computer use (Gray Swan's Shade adaptive attacker), and browser use (an internal Best-of-N attacker), with and without extra safeguards and across different attempt budgets. For Opus 4.6, results range from 0% in coding to 85.7% in computer use with 200 attempts and no safeguards (78.6% with extended thinking). Anthropic notes that, unlike earlier Claude models, extended thinking increased ART attack success for this model.

Jan 20, 2026
Cyata discloses three flaws in Anthropic's reference Git MCP server reachable via prompt injection
AttackVulnerability disclosureCyata, Anthropic

Cyata found path-validation and argument-injection flaws in Anthropic's mcp-server-git (CVE-2025-68143, -68144, -68145) that, chained with the Filesystem MCP server, allowed file access and code execution by anyone able to influence what the assistant reads. Anthropic removed the git_init tool and added path validation in fixed releases.

Jan 9, 2026
Anthropic's next-generation Constitutional Classifiers cut overhead to about 1% using probe cascades
DefensePaperAnthropic

Anthropic describes Constitutional Classifiers++, a cascade in which a cheap linear probe on model activations screens all traffic and escalates flagged exchanges to a probe-classifier ensemble. It reports roughly 1% added compute if applied to Claude Opus 4.0 traffic (the first generation added 23.7%) and a 0.05% refusal rate on harmless queries over one month of Claude Sonnet 4.5 traffic. Red-teamers found no universal jailbreak in over 1,700 hours.

Jan 8, 2026
PNNL uses a Claude-based agent to speed adversary emulation against a water treatment plant model
DefensePaperAnthropic, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, CISA

Anthropic reports that Pacific Northwest National Laboratory built a scaffold around Claude Sonnet 4 to automate adversary emulation against a high-fidelity cyber-physical model of a water treatment plant used for CISA. PNNL estimates attack reconstruction took three hours instead of multiple weeks; in one run the model switched to a different known privilege-escalation technique when a provided tool failed.

Nov 24, 2025
Anthropic reports 1.4% prompt injection success for Claude Opus 4.5 with improved Chrome extension safeguards
DefenseEvaluation reportAnthropic, Gray Swan AI

Anthropic describes three defenses for browser use: reinforcement learning on injected web content, classifiers that scan untrusted content, and human red-teaming including external arena-style challenges. Against an internal adaptive Best-of-N attacker with 100 attempts per environment, its chart shows Claude Opus 4.5 with the improved Claude for Chrome safeguards at 1.4% attack success (8.0% for the model alone), which the post rounds to 1%. Anthropic says this still represents meaningful risk.

Nov 13, 2025
Anthropic disrupts a state-sponsored espionage campaign it says was largely executed by Claude Code
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic, GTG-1002

Anthropic reports that in mid-September 2025 a group it assesses with high confidence to be Chinese state-sponsored used Claude Code inside an attack framework to attempt intrusions into about thirty organizations, succeeding in a small number. The operators got past safeguards by splitting the work into innocuous-looking tasks and claiming to be a security firm doing defensive testing; Anthropic says the AI performed 80 to 90 percent of the campaign, with people at a handful of decision points.

Oct 20, 2025
Anthropic adds OS-level filesystem and network sandboxing to Claude Code and open-sources the runtime
DefenseTool releaseAnthropic

Anthropic describes sandboxing for Claude Code that restricts file writes to permitted directories and routes network traffic through a proxy that only allows approved hosts, so a prompt-injected agent cannot modify sensitive files or exfiltrate data freely. Anthropic says internal use showed an 84% reduction in permission prompts, and it released the sandbox runtime, built on bubblewrap and macOS seatbelt, as an open-source research preview.

Oct 3, 2025
Anthropic says it trained Claude Sonnet 4.5 for defensive vulnerability finding and patching
DefensePaperAnthropic, HackerOne, CrowdStrike

Anthropic reports that a small team focused Claude Sonnet 4.5 training on finding and patching vulnerabilities and on testing simulated security infrastructure, while avoiding enhancements that clearly favour offence. It reports Sonnet 4.5 results on Cybench and CyberGym, a preliminary patching study in which 15% of patches were judged semantically equivalent to human references, and invites work on SOC and SIEM automation.

Aug 27, 2025
Anthropic reports Claude Code used to run a data-extortion campaign against at least 17 organizations
AttackMisuse reportAnthropic

Anthropic's August 2025 threat intelligence report describes a criminal who used Claude Code to automate reconnaissance, credential harvesting and network intrusion against at least 17 organizations, including healthcare, emergency services, government and religious institutions, then threatened to publish the stolen data. The report also describes North Korean operatives using Claude to obtain and keep remote technical jobs, and a low-skill actor selling ransomware developed with Claude.

Aug 8, 2025
AIxCC final: Team Atlanta wins as systems patch 43 of 54 found synthetic bugs and find 18 real ones
DefenseCompetitionDARPA, ARPA-H, Team Atlanta

DARPA reports that seven finalist cyber reasoning systems analyzed over 54 million lines of code, found 54 unique synthetic vulnerabilities in 63 challenges and patched 43, and found 18 real non-synthetic vulnerabilities with 11 patches. Team Atlanta won $4 million, Trail of Bits $3 million and Theori $1.5 million; DARPA and ARPA-H added $1.4 million for real-world integration and four systems were open-sourced on the day.

Jun 18, 2025
MCP specification revision classifies servers as OAuth resource servers and adds security best practices
PolicyStandardModel Context Protocol project, Anthropic

The 2025-06-18 revision of the Model Context Protocol specification classifies MCP servers as OAuth resource servers with protected resource metadata, and requires clients to implement RFC 8707 resource indicators so malicious servers cannot obtain tokens meant for others. It also clarifies authorization security considerations and adds a security best practices page.

Jun 17, 2025
SHADE-Arena measures whether agents can pursue hidden harmful side tasks without being caught by monitors
DefenseBenchmarkAnthropic, Redwood Research

Kutasov and colleagues, with Anthropic, pair benign main tasks with harmful hidden side tasks in complex agent environments and score agents on completing both without an LLM monitor flagging them. The best sabotage agents succeeded 27% (Claude 3.7 Sonnet) and 15% (Gemini 2.5 Pro) of the time against a Claude 3.6 Sonnet monitor; the best monitor reached an AUC of 0.87.

May 22, 2025
Anthropic activates ASL-3 deployment and security protections for Claude Opus 4
CapabilityThresholdAnthropic

Anthropic activated ASL-3 protections for Claude Opus 4 as a precaution because it could not rule out ASL-3 CBRN risk; the announcement does not cite cyber capability as the trigger. The ASL-3 security standard it describes includes more than 100 controls to protect weights, two-party authorization for weight access, and egress bandwidth controls against exfiltration.

Feb 3, 2025
Anthropic introduces Constitutional Classifiers against universal jailbreaks
DefensePaperAnthropic

Anthropic describes input and output classifiers trained on synthetic data generated from a natural-language constitution of allowed and disallowed content, targeted at chemical-weapons style queries. In automated testing on Claude 3.5 Sonnet, jailbreak success fell from 86% to 4.4%, and a prior bug bounty found no universal jailbreak; a public demo in February 2025 did yield one universal jailbreak.

Jan 17, 2025
US AISI (later CAISI) shows red-team attacks and repeated attempts raise agent hijacking rates on AgentDojo
DefenseEvaluation reportNIST, US Center for AI Standards and Innovation, UK AI Security Institute

NIST's AI safety institute technical staff (renamed the Center for AI Standards and Innovation in June 2025) extended AgentDojo and red-teamed agents built on the upgraded Claude 3.5 Sonnet. On held-out Workspace tasks, attack success rose from 11% for the strongest baseline attack to 81% for the strongest newly developed attack, and across five injection tasks from 57% to 80% when each attack was tried 25 times. The team released an Inspect-based AgentDojo port and ran the red teaming with the UK AI Security Institute.

Oct 15, 2024
Anthropic RSP v2 lists cyber operations as a capability under ongoing assessment, not a threshold
PolicyFrameworkAnthropic

Anthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy version 2.0, effective October 15, 2024, and its 2.x revisions list cyber operations among capabilities requiring ongoing assessment rather than as a formal capability threshold with required safeguards. The policy says Anthropic would consult cyber experts, consider tiered access controls or phased deployment for models with advanced cyber capabilities, and run pre- or post-deployment testing.

Aug 9, 2023
DARPA launches the AI Cyber Challenge to build AI systems that find and fix open-source vulnerabilities
DefenseCompetitionDARPA, Anthropic, Google

At Black Hat USA 2023, DARPA announced the AI Cyber Challenge (AIxCC), a two-year competition to build AI-driven systems that automatically find and fix vulnerabilities in critical open-source software. Anthropic, Google, Microsoft and OpenAI agreed to provide technology and expertise to competitors, OpenSSF served as challenge advisor, and semifinal and final rounds were scheduled for DEF CON 2024 and 2025.